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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A.   BACKGROUND 
As the Congress and President continue to "downsize" or "right 
size" the Department of Defense (DOD) through budget reductions, 
DOD still must provide the maximum amount of national defense 
possible in an evolving, tense geopolitical environment, fulfilling 
all the goals and objectives of the national security strategy. 
For a business to become a world-class performer capable of 
successfully competing in the global economy, that business must 
develop various strategies to maintain its competitive advantage. 
A competitive advantage is the superior strength or skill any 
organization possesses, such as its production, marketing, 
managerial, organizational, functional or leadership capabilities, 
which provide that organization with a unique advantage over its 
competitors. Strategies which maintain that competitive advantage 
range from designing and continuously improving product quality 
(product strategy) to open communication, employee cross-training 
and participation (human resources strategy), to the minimization 
of inventory investment (inventory strategy). To remain a world- 
class performer, the organization must continue to improve in 
meeting their customers' three major needs: product quality, low 
cost (price) and rapid delivery (Heizer, 1993). 
Likewise, DOD must embrace many of these same concepts to 
maintain its lead position in providing national security to the 
nation and its allies. 
Having a competitive advantage is of little value if that 
competitive advantage can not be sustained. Rosabeth Moss Kanter 
of Harvard lists four bases for sustaining the organization's 
competitive advantage: core competence, time compression, focus on 
continuous improvement, and relationships (Kanter, 1990). 
1. Core competence is that which the organization does best. 
For example, Salinas Valley Memorial Hospital's (SVMH) 
core competence is providing quality health care; for DOD, 
it is developing and maintaining superior military 
capabilities. 
2. Time compression is the ability to be first in marketing 
a new product, or reducing production lead time, or 
responding quickly to changing environment.  Examples 
include new Wellness clinics established by SVMH, and a 
rapid, worldwide, deployment force being developed by DOD. 
3. Focus on continuous improvement means reviewing processes 
and procedures to better meet the customers' requirements. 
SVMH reviews policies, guidelines, methods and operating 
procedures continually; for DOD, the Total Quality 
Leadership (TQL) program focuses these same efforts on both 
DOD's internal and external customers. 
4. Relationships refer to associations and alliances with 
differing organizations to achieve a common goal or 
objective.  SVMH has established relationships with its 
vendors to rapidly deliver its medical supplies; DOD has 
established relationships with various NATO allies for the 
common defense of the European theater. 
Through these four bases, business and organizations sustain 
their competitive advantages.   To maintain its competitive 
advantage, DOD should, to the maximum extent possible, operate 
"business-like." DOD does this by developing and implementing 
strategies which are designed to continuously improve the manner in 
which DOD meets the demands of national security. Those demands 
require DOD to achieve and maintain sufficient and necessary 
readiness to counter any national security threat at the lowest 
cost possible. DOD can only accomplish those goals by efficiently 
optimizing all available resources - resources which include 
technology, personnel and finances. While financial resources are 
the most visible and easiest to direct of all resources, measuring 
their relative effectiveness towards achieving and maintaining 
appropriate levels of national security are the most difficult. 
In an environment of declining budgets, DOD in general, and 
the Department of the Navy (DON) in particular, should try to 
obtain maximum efficiency from every budgeted dollar. Procurements 
of major weapons systems are seldom based on cost-benefit analysis 
or efficiency alone, but rather on current military strategies, 
topological concerns and even the procuring branch of the armed 
service (Goure, 1993). Moreover, DOD's external customers 
(ultimately, the American taxpayers) expect wise investments in 
their national security. The results of the efficiency of those 
investments in national defense can not be tested directly without 
a major conflagration. Instead, highly accurate, surrogate methods 
of measurement should be developed and utilized. 
With limited financial resources, trade-offs regarding 
resource investments are also necessary. These trade-offs should 
be analyzed in light of their contribution to achieving the desired 
level of national security, not their cost savings or cost 
avoidance potential alone. Using only accounting ratios and 
return-on-investment measurements, without regard to meeting 
internal and external customer service levels, obscures DOD's goal, 
maximizing national security interests while minimizing resources. 
Businesses in the private sector face similar challenges. 
Finite resources mandate that they operate as efficiently as their 
competitors. The primary objective of any organization, private or 
public, "profit" or "not-for-profit," is survival. Only after a 
organization has met all its operating expenses can it accomplish 
its secondary objective - to make a profit. Profit is defined as 
the reason an industry, firm or enterprise is in business (Fields, 
1995). Broadly defined, profit may include returning dividends to 
stockholders, providing a sense of community Wellness or providing 
for national security. In all cases, to make a profit, an 
organization must be as efficient as its competition. Relative 
success in achieving profits can be measured by an organization's 
relative efficiency and the level of customer service provided. 
Comparing the efficiency methodologies of successful private 
sector business organizations to public sector methodologies will 
expose public organizations to different efficiency measurement 
tools. By studying the inventory stocking criteria used by 
efficient private businesses, public organizations will have an 
opportunity to obtain similar efficient results in their inventory 
programs. 
B.   THESIS OBJECTIVE 
1. Focus on Efficiency 
This paper will focus on the efficiencies, cost savings and 
trade-offs generated as a result of the Navy's Inventory Control 
Point, Mechanicsburg, PA's (NAVICP-M) research into developing a 
COSAL inventory model to reduce shipboard inventories. It will 
contrast that model's approach to shipboard inventory levels with 
that of a private industry's approach. 
2. Methodology 
This thesis will begin by discussing both technical and 
allocative efficiencies and the conditions that characterize 
efficient outcomes. By measuring the economic efficiencies in 
regard to budgetary limitations, DOD and DON can ascertain whether 
their discretionary spending programs have effectively maximized 
the appropriate levels of national defense for the minimum 
expenditures. DOD and DON generally determine the effectiveness of 
their expenditures by measuring the overall contribution of defense 
to national security. A national defense program that is not 
"ready" to meet any and all threats to that nation's security is 
ineffective in maximizing national defense. DOD and DON use 
"Readiness Indicators" to measure effectiveness in meeting 
potential threats. 
3.   The Navy Focus 
This thesis will then center on one facet of those indicators, 
fleet readiness. For overall fleet readiness to be high each ship 
must be in its highest possible condition of material readiness. 
To accomplish this, ships have always carried an assortment of 
spare parts for emergent repairs. In 1956 the Navy implemented the 
Coordinated Shipboard Allowance List (COSAL) program to standardize 
procurement and storage of repair parts onboard naval ships. The 
COSAL lists all reported equipments and weapons systems onboard an 
individual ship, all the maintenance significant repair parts 
embodied in those equipments and weapons systems, and an inventory 
allowance listing of authorized repair parts to be stocked onboard. 
The Navy's supporting COSAL inventory model is the Fleet Logistics 
Support Improvement Program (FLSIP). The COSAL consolidated 
independent shipboard work center storerooms into a centrally 
managed storeroom location. 
4.   Point Five FLSIP Plus (.5F+) COSAL Inventory Model 
The .5F+ inventory model was developed at NAVTCP-M in response 
to the Packard Commission's 198 6 report.  The Packard Commission 
was a Presidential commission formed to investigate defense 
management  and  recommend  improvements  in  DOD's  operation, 
organization and management. The commission's report recommended 
that a variety of improvements be made in DOD's management 
practices and organizational structure. In February of 1989, the 
President charged the Secretary of Defense to devise a plan to 
implement the Packard Commissions' report. 
The Secretary's mission was to reduce the overall cost of 
operating and maintaining the armed services without adversely 
impacting national security or national defense. His plan, the 
Defense Management Report or DMR was approved by the President in 
July 1989. Among other things, it initiated the .current 
"downsizing" philosophy and began the base-closure process. The 
preliminary goal of the DMR was to reduce or "save" $70 billion 
through 1995. 
Initial reduction initiatives were known as Defense Management 
Review Decisions or DMRDs. One DMRD, DMRD 981, called for reducing 
spare parts inventories at all stocking levels. This savings 
initiative involved consolidating supply depots, disposing of slow- 
moving, high-value inventory items (range) and buying to lower 
inventory levels (depth). Not only would the initial capital 
outlay be reduced, but lower inventory levels would generate 
savings in all logistic areas associated with maintaining that 
inventory. Lower inventory levels would reduce holding costs 
(including costs of safety stock, warehousing costs, and costs of 
goods-in-transit or "pipe-line" inventory), transportation costs, 
ordering costs, initial procurement costs, and stock out costs. 
In 1991 NAVICP-M supported that initiative by investigating 
the feasibility of reducing first echelon inventory levels 
maintained on board ships. To accomplish this objective, NAVICP-M 
changed both the allowance model and the method of computing 
onboard inventory storeroom allowances. 
The new model,.5F+, assists in that regard, refining the range 
and depth of shipboard storeroom inventories, and weighing customer 
demand-based and insurance-based criteria to determine sparing 
levels. Not only should shipboard storeroom inventories optimize 
the physical constraints of piece, weight and cube, they should 
also optimize expenditures based on budget constraints and customer 
service levels. One objective of the .5F+ COSAL model is to 
efficiently maximize the shipboard storeroom inventory based on 
budget constraints while meeting customer demands. This thesis 
will describe the methodology and decision-making criteria involved 
in constructing this customer-oriented model. 
5.   The Salinas Valley Memorial Hospital (SVMH) Model 
This thesis will also examine a private sector, not-for-profit 
organization, the Salinas Valley Memorial Hospital (SVMH). In 
establishing their inventory levels and policies, SVMH also uses 
customer demand-based and insurance-based criteria like the .5F+ 
model.    This  thesis  will  investigate  the  methodologies, 
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measurements and results that SVMH achieves relative to its overall 
effectiveness and efficiency. Both the .5F+ model and the SVMH 
model were designed to satisfy their internal customers' demands 
for service; specifically, by providing the right part at the right 
time at the right place in the right quantity for the lowest cost. 
One measurement of customer satisfaction is the level of 
customer service that an organization provides. Improvements in 
efficiency not only increase an organization's profit, they also 
increase that organization's level of customer satisfaction. The 
efficiencies and effectiveness of both organizations will also be 
compared. The comparisons will be measured by their output results 
- the manner and degree to which each organization meets and 
satisfies its respective customers' needs. Comparing inventory 
programs and the results of their respective inventory decisions 
should provide a closer evaluation of the efficiencies of both 
organizations. 
6.   Trade-Off Analysis 
Finally, this thesis will discuss the measurement tools that 
both DON and SVMH use to calibrate efficiency as well as the 
resultant trade-offs necessary to achieve that efficiency. Trade- 
off discussions will range from the initial trade-offs used in 
determining candidate selection through the impact of reduced 
shipboard inventories on future readiness. 
If more efficient storeroom inventory construction procedures 
can be developed then the potential exists for both DOD and DON 
inventory logistics activities to increase their contributions to 
overall national security by optimizing their budget dollars. 
Should analysis also determine that SVMH has greater efficiency 
than DON's shipboard inventory, then SVMH's approach to inventory 
determinations should be adopted to increase the relative 
efficiency of DOD's inventory operation and improve customer 
service. By identifying procedures which enable inventory managers 
to optimize the mixture of spare parts carried onboard, not only 
will scarce budget dollars be efficiently allocated, but the 
overall military readiness posture will also be enhanced. Improved 
identification of internal customer requirements can also generate 
long-range, downstream procurement savings. 
While this study will not definitively optimize resource- 
dollars, it will attempt to quantify applicable measurement tools 
to more accurately determine overall allocative efficiency. It 
will also suggest methods of improving product mix for shipboard 
inventories closely attuned to the internal customers' 
requirements. 
C.   SCOPE 
This thesis will discuss, analyze and evaluate efficiency and 
readiness indicators relative to the .5F+ COSAL model and contrast 
10 
them with the demand-based, private-sector model used by SVMH. 
Discussions relative to readiness and readiness indicators will be 
based on both official DOD and DON publications as well as 
congressional reports. The appropriateness of using readiness 
indicators as measurement tools, as well as any alternative 
applicable measurement tools, will also be discussed. 
Information regarding the development, results and 
implementation of the Navy's .5F+ COSAL model will be based on 
interviews, literature and limited unpublished supporting 
documentation obtained while the author was assigned to NAVICP-M 
from 1990 - 1992 and helped to develop the .5F+ model. 
Comparisons and contrasts regarding the impact of the 
customer-oriented model with previous models in terms of 
reliability, effectiveness (as a measure of customer service) and 
cost savings will also be made. 
All data relative to Salinas Valley Memorial Hospital's (SVMH) 
inventory management policies, procedures and inventory model 
utilization was obtained by personal interviews and discussions 
with the Material Management Director of Salinas Valley Memorial 
Hospital in May and October 1995. Efficiency in both the COSAL 
model and the SVMH model will also be compared. DOD's efficiency 
will be measured by the contribution to readiness and national 
defense that the .5F+ COSAL model produces in terms of 
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effectiveness; SVMH's efficiency will be measured by the ability of 
the inventory management program to satisfy its customers' demands. 
Finally, trade-offs and the impact of those trade-offs 
relative to DOD's and DON's budget constraints and limitations, 
storeroom inventories and overall impact on readiness will be 
investigated. This discussion will include the impact of those 
trade-offs towards improving efficiency. 
D.   THESIS ORGANIZATION 
To facilitate comparison and contrast of efficiency and 
associated trade-offs in both models, this thesis is organized into 
the following chapters. 
Chapter II is an overview and discussion of efficiency, 
efficient allocation of resources and readiness. 
Chapter III illustrates how the basic COSAL model for 
shipboard inventory allowances of repair parts was developed. It 
shows how that basic computational model was expanded to meet 
current readiness concerns and provides historical background 
information on the development of the Navy's shipboard inventory 
models through the current model, the .5F+ COSAL model. It also 
discusses the relative effectiveness of that inventory model. 
Chapter IV likewise provides an introduction and discussion of 
SVMH's inventory management model/program and the overall 
effectiveness of that model/program. 
12 
Chapter V draws a comparative analysis between each 
organization and their respective models with recommendations for 
improvement where appropriate. 
Chapter VI discusses the various trade-off analyses and 
implications of those trade-offs to overall readiness. 
Chapter VII summarizes the findings and provides 
recommendations for further research. 
13 
14 
II.  OVERVIEW OF EFFICIENCY AND READINESS 
This chapter will begin with an introduction to the economic 
similarities between public organizations, e.g., the Department 
of Defense (DOD), and private organizations, Salinas Valley 
Memorial Hospital (SVMH), and the role that efficiency plays in 
decision making. A brief discussion of efficiency and some of 
the problems management encounters trying to measure efficiency 
will follow.  Concepts addressed will be those of technical 
efficiency, allocative efficiency and "forced efficiency."  The 
chapter will conclude by describing the methods which both DOD 
and SVMH use to measure their levels of efficiency. 
A.   ECONOMIC SIMILARITIES OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INDUSTRIES 
The public sector of the economy uses the same philosophical 
approach to economic decision making as the private sector, 
maximizing productivity (output) while minimizing resources 
(input).  Success for any industry, firm or organization is 
measured in terms of profit. Additionally, organizations that 
have achieved the status of a world-class performer maintain 
their competitive advantage by continuously improving the way 
they meet their customers' needs and requirements. A "for- 
profit" business measures "profit" as financial return to 
partners, owners, and stockholders.  The "not-for-profit" (NFP) 
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organization measures "profit" as contributions to corporate or 
foundation goals.  DOD and the Department of the Navy (DON) 
measure profit or success in terms of "Readiness Indicators." 
Readiness indicators, which measure military preparedness and 
customer service levels, were designed to help measure the 
military's overall contribution to satisfying the national 
military strategy. 
The national military strategy is the military's strategic 
plan for implementing the President's National Security Strategy. 
The National Security Strategy has three major objectives: 
1. Enhancing national security through maintenance of a 
strong defense capability, 
2. Promoting national economic prosperity through opening 
and expanding foreign markets, 
3. Promoting international democracy (White House, 1995). 
DOD and the military have only one purpose - to secure and 
defend the national security interests of the United States. "Our 
forces must be sufficiently ready - manned, equipped, trained and 
sustainable - to meet (the) deployment requirements our (national 
security) strategy demands" (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995). 
From a economic perspective, the laws of Supply and Demand 
apply equally to both private and public sector organizations. 
As Figure 1 illustrates, Supply and Demand curves establish a 
market equilibrium price (EP) for all goods and services. 
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Figure 1.  Supply and Demand Curves 
Assuming a downward-sioping demand curve, when aggregate demand 
increases as a result of a change in resource availability or 
priorities, the aggregate demand curve will shift upward and to 
the right from ADX to AD2-  For example, DOD, anticipating that 
the budget would decrease, would begin demanding more weapons 
systems and platforms, trading off spares inventory and readiness 
to finance their procurement. 
During the late 1980's such a scenario occurred.  Faced with 
the challenge of financing, constructing and outfitting a 600- 
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ship navy with finite resources, DON began shifting budget 
dollars away from spares inventory and into procurement. 
Additionally, DON accepted lower material readiness rates, 
deferring both maintenance and upgrades to fund procurements. 
Readiness degradation projected an annual savings of $1.6 billion 
dollars; spares contributed an additional one billion dollars a 
year (Greeley, 1988).  Figure 1 shows that both the short-run 
production of weapons systems and associated prices would rise 
from Y1  to Y2 and Px to P2 respectively.  The equilibrium price 
for those weapons systems shifts from EPi to EP2, redistributing 
scarce resources to procurement at the cost of readiness 
(Gwartney, 1992). 
In 1994-95, the movement is from procurement to readiness, 
delaying fleet modernization by increasing operations and 
maintenance funding by 6%, and to quality-of-life issues such as 
housing upgrades (Readiness, 1994).  As DOD anticipates these 
budget constraints and begins to shift funding priorities, the 
aggregate demand curve for spares and services will shift upward 
and to the right.  In the short-run, market prices will also rise 
to a new, higher equilibrium level.  With limited resources, 
unless DOD counteracts the effect of rising prices, DOD's weapons 
systems purchasing power will be reduced again.  One possible 
alternative to offset the higher prices would be developing and 
implementing improvements in efficiency. 
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In the public sector, the price that DOD pays for the goods 
and services it consumes and the price that DOD charges its 
customers for the services it provides is influenced by Public 
Law through congressional budget action.  DOD's customer base 
consists of both internal and external customers.  DOD's internal 
customers are the immediate members of the armed forces, staff 
and families as well as the supporting infrastructure and 
employees.  DOD's external customers include not only U.S. 
taxpayers and citizens, but the nations' friends and allies as 
well.  Both the national security strategy and the national 
military strategy stress the United States' role in peacetime 
deterrence and prevention of conflict as well as war fighting. 
For example, the military's overseas bases and temporary 
deployments of both air, ground, and afloat forces, extend DOD's 
customer base beyond the United States. 
Demand by the military for goods and services is both finite 
and stochastic.  The challenges facing both DOD and DON are: 
1. How to increase value to the customer while reducing 
overall costs, 
2. How to provide an acceptable level of customer service, 
3. How to maximize contributions to readiness and national 
security while minimizing costs. 
For DON one method used to meet these challenges is through 
the Navy's Coordinated Shipboard Allowance List (COSAL) inventory 
19 
model.  The COSAL was designed to help maximize shipboard 
readiness while minimizing inventory requirements. 
B.   NEED FOR EFFICIENCY IN BUDGET DECISION MAKING 
National defense, like health care, is a public good.  This 
thesis will compare how DOD and a private sector, not-for-profit 
hospital, Salinas Valley Memorial Hospital (SVMH), meet the same 
inventory management challenges for their internal and external 
customers.  The structure and mission of SVMH impose budget 
constraints similar to those faced by DOD.  SVMH, like DOD, must 
be ready to respond to emergency situations or crises.  To 
maximize readiness while providing high levels of customer 
service subject to budget constraints, both SVMH and DOD must 
operate as efficiently as possible.  To discover what types of 
efficiencies are operating at SVMH, investigative research 
focused on the kinds of inventory that SVMH manages and the 
inventory model/program that SVMH uses to manage that inventory. 
Inventory selection criteria and the associated tradeoff 
decisions were investigated as well as some of the limitations 
involved in implementing SVMH's inventory management program. 
This data was used to gauge the overall efficiency of SVMH's 
program.  Analysis of the efficiencies of SVMH's inventory 
program form the basis for comparison with the Navy's COSAL 
inventory management model/program. 
20 
However, before any comparisons can be made between DON and 
SVMH regarding their efficiencies, efficiency and the conditions 
that characterize efficient outcomes must be discussed.  It is 
only by comparing the efficiencies of DOD's and SVMH's inventory 
program that recommendations can be made to improve the 
efficiencies of both organizations.  Secondly, methods of 
measuring each organization's efficiency must also be addressed. 
C.   DEFINITION OF EFFICIENCY 
1.   Unconstrained and Constrained Optimization 
When an economy with a limited quantity of competing 
resources is viewed from a macro perspective, efficiencies occur 
at those intersections of supply and demand curves for goods and 
services.  Those equilibrium points maximize the total values of 
those goods and services, where value is defined in terms of 
consumers' incomes and preferences, subject to any given 
constraints (Gates, 1995). 
Once a business organization has chosen a particular range 
of goods and services to produce, it then selects the best 
strategic plan to maximize its profit.  Profit maximization 
decisions may be based on the availability of capital to the 
business.  A business with unlimited access is considered 
unconstrained; one with limited access is constrained. A 
business may also be constrained with respect to limitations on 
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their customers' budget.  For the unconstrained business, 
optimization occurs at maximum efficiency.  Efficiency results 
when Marginal Cost (MC), the cost of producing an additional unit 
at the current production rate, equals the customer's Marginal 
Benefit (MB), usually depicted by the demand curve. 
For the constrained organization such as DOD, the objective 
is to maximize output subject to various resource constraints 
such as infrastructure, personnel, and budget to name a few.  For 
constrained optimization efficiency can be defined as that 
combination of goods and services such that the ratio of the 
Marginal Cost of producing that next unit of the good or service 
to the Marginal Benefit derived from that unit exactly equals the 
ratio of the Marginal Costs of producing all other goods and 
services to the Marginal Benefits derived from all other goods 
and services.  Efficiency can be represented as follows: 
MB MB MB x      _ Y      _     z 
MCX MCY MCZ 
In this formula X represents a good or service, Y a different 
good or service and Z another good or service (Gates, 1995). 
2.   Technical and Allocative Efficiency 
A Production Possibilities Frontier curve (PPFc) is a 
representation of all possible combinations of the total output 
that could be produced, assuming (1) a fixed amount or quantity 
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of resources,(2) resources are being used efficiently, and 
(3) technology is not changing but is constant (Gwartney, 1992). 
Graphically the PPFc illustrates the optimal mix of goods and 
services that could be produced from limited resources.  Any 
point along the PPFc is a technically efficient utilization of 
those resources, assuming that all resources are being used 
wisely with minimal waste.  In essence, the PPFc is an aggregate 
composite of many Technically Efficient (TE) points.  To obtain 
Allocative Efficiency (AE), i.e., that allocation of resources 
which produces the mix of goods and services desired most by 
consumers, goods and services must be produced in the mix that 
maximizes consumers' utility (Gwartney, 1992).  The relationship 
between these two types of efficiencies - Technical Efficiency 
(TE) and Allocative Efficiency (AE) and the Production 
Possibilities Frontier curve (PPFc) is illustrated by Figure 2. 
In it consumers demands or requirements are shown by a second 
curve, the Consumers' Utility curve (CUc).  This curve represents 
the aggregate sum of the consumer's preferences for all goods and 
services produced.  While TE can be any point along the PPFc, AE 
is located only at that point of tangency between the two curves. 
To determine when AE has been achieved, there must be some method 
of measuring movement towards or away from that tangency point. 
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Technical and Allocative Efficiencies 
G/S 1 = Goods and Services 1                                 G/S 2 = Goods and Services 2 
TE     = Technical Efficiency                                  AE     = Allocative Efficiency 
PPFc = Production Possibility Frontier Curve      CUc    = Consumers' Utility Curve 
Figure 2.  Efficiency Tangency Points 
For DOD, G/S 1 and G/S 2 represent all possible goods and 
services that DOD can produce to ensure the highest level of 
national security based on fixed amount of financial resources. 
Examples of typical goods and services that DOD produces range 
from power projection through forward deployed battle groups to 
the Adriatic, bilateral and multilateral joint training exercises 
with NATO allies, drug interdiction in the Caribbean to inventory 
and logistic supply support.  To achieve technical efficiency 
(TE) DOD must optimize the production of those goods and services 
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by fully utilizing all available resources with minimal waste. 
To achieve allocative efficiency (AE) DOD's optimal mix of those 
goods and services must maximize DOD's customers' utility, their 
demands and expectations. 
3.   Movement Towards Allocative Efficiency 
An organization is "inefficient" if its operating point (OP) 
either does not lie along the PPFc (is not technically efficient) 
or its OP is on the PPFc (is technically efficient) but is not 
located reasonably close to its allocative efficiency point.  In 
such a scenario, what options are available to move that 
organization closer to first technical efficiency and second 
allocative efficiency?  The decision makers in this scenario 
must decide why the organization has not achieved allocative 
efficiency.  If management is not incompetent or untrustworthy, 
then the assumption must be that management either believes it is 
at its AE point or believes that it has achieved a TE point that 
is reasonably close to its AE point and the■necessary investment 
to achieve allocative efficiency is not cost effective.  If 
management knew it had not achieved allocative efficiency, then 
it would institute policies and procedures to move closer to that 
tangency point.  In a free market economy, competition, as 
reflected in the market price, tends to move businesses towards 
allocative efficiency.  However, there may be barriers unrelated 
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to competition which prevent management from achieving technical 
and allocative efficiency such as: 
1. Ineffective policies and procedures (both internally 
and externally imposed) which hinder management from 
moving towards allocative efficiency, 
2. Management using the wrong tools to accurately 
measure its movement towards allocative efficiency, 
3. Management using its existing tools improperly, and 
4. Lack of incentive programs or disincentive forces 
which inhibit efficiencies. 
Decision makers must remove all policy and procedural barriers 
which hinder or prevent management from realizing their full 
potential in achieving technical and allocative efficiency. 
4.   Forced Efficiency 
In a NFP organization decision makers could undertake a more 
coercive action and attempt to force the organization to become 
more efficient - "Forced Efficiency." 
An organization whose procurement budget is tightly 
controlled must make investment decisions - balancing and trading 
off acquisitions of new equipment for inventory.  If a business 
invests heavily in slow moving inventory, then inventory levels 
will rise while new equipment purchases decline.  Since technical 
efficiency is any mix of goods and services which can be produced 
by using all available resources without waste, a high inventory 
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to new equipment procurement ratio could be technically- 
efficient.  However, allocative efficiency is that tangency point 
between technical efficiency and maximization of consumers' 
utility.  A low stock turnover rate caused by high inventory 
levels would indicate that allocative efficiency probably had not 
been achieved.  With technical efficiency, slightly lower 
inventory levels can reduce overall national security.  However, 
this impact will be small because of the low inventory turnover 
rate.  If the savings realized by reducing inventory levels are 
invested in other "products" that produce a higher state of 
readiness such as weapons systems, personnel or training, then 
the net impact on national security would be positive.  In this 
example, consumer utility is defined as national security. 
If an organization lacked accountability over its inventory; 
if it was subject to fraud, waste, theft and mismanagement, then 
it would be technically inefficient.  Its efficiency position 
would no longer be on the PPFc.  Decision makers should undertake 
action to return that organization to the PPFc and move it along 
the PPFc towards allocative efficiency.  For a not-for-profit 
organization such as DOD, the leverage most readily available to 
force efficiency is budget reductions. 
In 1992, the United States General Accounting Office (GAO) 
concluded from their investigations that DOD's inventory of 
spares had grown too large to be efficient.  GAO's studies showed 
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that DOD's inventory grew from $43 billion in 1980 to $100 
billion in 1990.  DOD's unrequired or excess inventory also 
increased.  GAO reported that in 1991 DOD held $40 billion of 
inventory beyond their needs.  That inventory included spares 
(repairable items and consumable items) as well as clothing, 
medical/dental supplies, construction and industrial supplies. 
Either DOD was at some operating point (OP) no longer on the PPFc 
or their TE point was too far from their AE point.  GAO also 
concluded that DOD's managers were subject to fraud, waste and 
incompetence.  Based on GAO's recommendation, Congress reduced 
DOD's spares' budget by four billion dollars (GAO/HR-93-12). 
Figure 3 represents what GAO was attempting to accomplish 
through those budget reduction recommendations.  GAO believed 
that DOD's OP was neither at TEX or AE2 but somewhere below PPFX. 
By reducing the spares budget, GAO hoped to force DOD to change 
its organizational culture and eliminate its inventory management 
problems by becoming a more efficient, cost-effective operation. 
DOD would no longer have "sufficient funds to support its long- 
standing business inefficiencies" (GAO/HR-93-12) .  A reduced 
spares budget would cause a downward shift of the PPF curve from 
PPF curve from PPFX to PPF2.  Although not implicitly stated, 
GAO's intent would not have been to reduce national security 
interests, i.e., impact readiness, but rather to shift the PPFc 
such that it coincided with or passed through 
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Weapons Systems A.acquisitions 
Efficiency through Spares Reduction 
BEFORE SPARES REDUCTIONS 
PPFi = Production Possibility Frontier 
TEt = Technical Efficiency 
AE i = AUocative Efficiency 
CU i  = Consumers' Utility Curve 
OP   = POP's Operating Point  
AFTER SPARES REDUCTIONS 
PPF2 = Production Possibility Frontier 
TE2 = Technical Efficiency 
AE2 - AUocative Efficiency 
CU2 - Consumers' Utility Curve 
Figure 3.  Spares Budget Reduction 
DOD's previous OP. Since the old OP would now be located beyond 
PPF2, DOD could not afford the previous OP and must move it 
downward.  GAO intended for DOD to move its OP first to TE2 on 
PPF2 and then to move its TE2 along PPF2 towards the new 
allocative efficiency point, AE2. 
However, as Figure 4 suggests, this attempt at "Forced 
Efficiency" could fail to achieve either technical efficiency or 
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Figure 4.     Forced Efficiency 
AFTER BUDGET REDUCTIONS 
PPF2 = Production Possibility Frontier 
TE2 = Technical Efficiency 
AE2 = Allocative Efficiency 
CU2 = Consumers' Utility Curve 
defense supplies necessary to meet all national security 
interests was a particular ratio of aircraft carriers, long range 
bombers, tanks and spares.  If DOD believed it was at technical 
efficiency point TEj. along PPFj., then DOD could attempt to 
maintain that same ratio of carriers, planes, tanks and spares 
regardless of budget constraints. 
Faced with an overall percentage reduction of DOD's budget, 
which would also cause the same downward shift of the PPF curve 
from PPFX to PPF2, DOD could proportionally reduce the number of 
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carriers, planes, tanks and spares procured to maintain its 
philosophical optimal mix ratios, establishing, for DOD, a new 
technical efficiency point, TE2.  This new point, TE2 , would be 
the same relative distance from the new allocative efficiency 
point AE2, i.e. (AE2 to TE2), after the budget reduction as the 
previous technical to allocative efficiency points (AEX to TEj.) 
were before the budget reduction. 
On the other hand, DOD could choose to alter the ratio of 
spares and weapons systems.  Facing a reduction of spares budget 
alone, DOD could re-program weapons systems procurement dollars 
into spares procurement, trading off weapons systems upgrades for 
spares maintenance.  If this avenue was prohibited by 
congressional action, then DOD could choose to do nothing. 
GAO acknowledged that the primary cause of the Navy's excess 
inventory was the result of ship deactivations, predicted demand 
for spares exceeding actual demand, and equipment replacements 
without prior notification to inventory managers (GAO/HR-93-12). 
If DOD believed that GAO was correct, that part of DOD's 
inventory was excessive, then doing nothing, coupled with an 
aggressive disposal action, would reduce the DOD's investment in 
spares inventories.  Postponing investment in spares for new 
weapons systems (spares previously acquired for older weapons 
systems are a "sunk cost" and have no impact on future 
procurements, excluding substitutability and holding costs) does 
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not necessarily correct the problem.  If postponing buying spares 
until demand has been recorded does not satisfy consumers 
utility, i.e., does not contribute to meeting readiness goals, 
then such action would move DOD along the PPFc away from 
allocative efficiency. 
In its annual report to Congress, the Congressional Budget 
Office (CBO) acknowledged that reducing funding and manpower, two 
major DOD resources, greatly reduces readiness (CBO, 1994).  DOD 
would not be doing "more with less" but rather doing "less with 
less." 
D.   MEASURING EFFICIENCY 
Since allocative efficiency is that tangency point between 
the optimal mix of goods and services that can be produced and 
the consumers' utility function, some method of measurement must 
be devised to determine where an organization's technical 
efficiency point lies along the PPFc relative to its allocative 
efficiency point. 
DOD can measure its movement towards or away from allocative 
efficiency as a level of contribution to military readiness by 
measuring its effectiveness in achieving its readiness goals. 
DOD must maximize readiness, subject to budget constraints, while 
establishing efficient outcomes. 
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SVMH, on the other hand, achieves allocative efficiency when 
its inventory management program maximizes customers' utility 
(customers' demands and expectations) within budget constrained 
resources.  By measuring the level of customer satisfaction or 
level of customer service, SVMH can determine whether it is 
moving towards or away from its point of allocative efficiency. 
E.   DOD'S METHOD OF MEASURING EFFICIENCY 
1.   Definition of Readiness 
The goal of any DON inventory allowance model should be to 
maintain or improve both fleet readiness and effectiveness while 
keeping the shipboard inventory levels and associated costs at a 
minimum.  Requirements for increasing efficiency become more 
critical as a result of reduced near-term funding and continued 
reductions in the long term.  Increasing efficiency allows DOD to 
absorb budget cuts without compromising national security.  To 
ensure that national security is maintained, DOD uses readiness 
indicators to measure efficiency.  Before discussing efficiency 
measurements, an understanding of readiness itself is necessary. 
Readiness has been defined in a variety of ways.  In January 
1976, during testimony before the Committee on Armed Services 
(CAS), House of Representatives,  Admiral Holloway, Chief of 
Naval Operations, defined readiness as "the ability of the fleet 
to successfully carry out those responsibilities for which we are 
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charged in support of our national security plans" (CAS, 1976). 
Fleet readiness is comprised of personnel and material readiness. 
Admiral Holloway went on to define material readiness as the 
ships being in "good operating condition" (CAS, 1976).  Measuring 
readiness can also vary based on political agenda.  In 1988 the 
Navy was committed to a 600-ship fleet.  The Navy traded off 
maintenance operations, spare-parts procurement and aircraft 
readiness rates to finance the build up (Greeley, 1988). 
Since readiness rates are reported as averages, by 
maintaining a higher degree of readiness for deployed units and a 
much lower rate for stateside assets, overall readiness levels 
have remained high.  Even in today's environment of reduced 
defense budgets, readiness remains the Pentagon's top priority. 
The FY95 defense budget increases funding for operations and 
maintenance by again trading off procurement dollars.  Secretary 
of Defense William Perry has indicated that the FY96 budget will 
likely continue this trend - trading off fleet modernization 
procurement funding for readiness (Readiness, 1994). 
2.   Reporting of Readiness 
DOD reports readiness to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) 
using the Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS). JCS 
uses this data along with other indicators to evaluate the 
overall military readiness posture and their ability to meet all 
national military strategy goals and missions.  SORTS provides a 
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snapshot view of how adequately prepared a unit is to perform its 
assigned missions with both material and personnel resources. 
The Navy measures the degree of material readiness 
capability of its ships based on casualty reports, or CASREPs, 
sent by individual ships.  The Naval Warfare Publication 10-1-10 
(NWP 10) describes a C-3 CASREP as a major degradation of a 
mission area capability; a C-4 CASREP is a loss of the ability to 
perform a mission.  For example, if one of two missile launchers 
on a cruiser is inoperative, that ship would report a C-3 CASREP. 
If the second missile launcher became inoperative as well, that 
would be a C-4 CASREP (NWP 10). 
A recent General and Accounting Office (GAO) report 
commented on the limitations of SORTS.  While SORTS does report 
personnel, equipment and training deficiencies, it only measures 
individual service readiness.  SORTS neither addresses the issue 
of joint readiness nor does it provide a method of forecasting 
changes in readiness posture (GAO/NSIAD-95-29). 
3.   Changes to Readiness Reporting 
GAO has attempted to identify "critical readiness 
indicators" which, together with SORTS, can provide a fuller 
readiness assessment (GAO/T-NSIAD-95-117).  Through field level 
research GAO refined a listing of over 650 indicators to six 
critical indices: personnel deployability status, unit readiness 
and proficiency, operational tempo, weapon systems proficiency, 
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funding, and unit and intermediate maintenance performance. 
Several corrective initiatives have been undertaken to improve 
the readiness assessment picture.  These initiatives include 
forming the Office of the Under secretary of Defense for 
Personnel and Readiness, establishing the JCS's Senior Readiness 
Oversight Council and creating the Joint Readiness System.  The 
three service branches have begun developing and implementing 
readiness improvement assessments (GAO/T-NSIAD-95-117). 
This thesis, however, will focus on the material aspects of 
readiness.  One factor which impacts shipboard material readiness 
is the ability of the ship to repair its own weapon system 
casualties by drawing needed repair parts from its own 
storerooms.  Those shipboard storerooms represent the ship's 
allowance of repair parts, the first echelon of DOD inventory. 
4.  Measuring the Contribution of Shipboard Inventory to 
Readiness 
Effective management of shipboard storeroom inventories 
reduces stockouts, contributing directly to the ship's material 
readiness condition. Measuring the fill rate of customer demands 
for authorized allowance-based repair parts from shipboard 
inventories is one indication of the ship's contribution to 
material readiness.  This measurement, called the Net 
Effectiveness of the ship, is calculated as follows: 
Net Effectiveness   =     Total Issues From Stock 
Total Demands For stocked items 
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Another measurement of the effectiveness of inventory 
management is Gross Effectiveness, the filling of a customer's 
demand for any item, whether or not that item is authorized to be 
carried onboard.  Gross Effectiveness is calculated by the 
following formula: 
Gross Effectiveness  =   Total Issues From Stock 
TOtax uemanas tor  Any item 
Net Effectiveness goals have been established at 85 percent, 
Gross Effectiveness at 65 percent (OPNAVINST 4441.12B).  As a 
ship's effectiveness approaches, meets or exceeds these 
effectiveness goals, the overall contribution of individual 
storeroom inventories to material readiness increases while the 
percent of stock outs deceases. 
F.   SVMH METHOD OF MEASURING EFFICIENCY 
1.   Definition of Customer Service Level 
Successfully determining a business's movement towards or 
away from allocative efficiency requires developing and utilizing 
appropriate measurement tools.  While DOD uses readiness 
indicators, many private sector industries, such as SVMH, measure 
efficiency based on the quality of customer service provided. 
Quality of customer service indicators can be measured either as 
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a probability of not "stocking out" (not running out) or as a 
service level percentage (fill rate). 
The difference in choice of measurement tools depends upon 
the organization's management strategy - customer orientation or 
product orientation.  By measuring the probability of not 
stocking out, management directs its attention to such issues as 
resupply, product availability, restocking criteria, etc.  In 
doing so, management neglects its company's most important and 
valuable asset - the customer.  By focusing on customer service 
levels attention is also drawn to similar issues such as not 
stocking out measurements.  However, meeting the needs and 
demands of the customer is paramount. A 95 percent probability 
of not stocking out is unimportant to the customer if the part is 
not available when the customer needs it. 
2.   Methods of Measuring Efficiency for SVMH 
Unlike DOD, SVMH does not have a mathematically precise 
method of directly measuring customer satisfaction.  SVMH's 
Material Management Department (MMD) is responsible for all 
aspects of inventory management.  Like DOD, MMD's technical 
efficiency also depends on budget constraints. MMD has achieved 
technical efficiency when it also optimizes the procurement of 
those necessary goods and services required by its internal and 
external customers, fully utilizing its limited fiscal resources 
with minimal waste.  To achieve allocative efficiency, MMD's 
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inventory management program must satisfy its customers' demands 
(customers' utility) by providing them quality, low cost products 
and rapidly responding to their demands within their budget 
constraints.  As the level of customer service increases, SVMH is 
moving closer to achieving allocative efficiency.  Once SVMH has 
achieved technical efficiency, by measuring and comparing that 
level of customer service or customer satisfaction to previous 
measurements, SVMH can determine whether it is moving towards or 
away from its point of allocative efficiency. 
Since MMD measures success (its profit) by the level of 
customer service quality or customer service satisfaction, MMD 
can not measure its movement towards allocative efficiency solely 
on how well MMD achieved budgeted performance goals or the size 
of MMD's contribution to organizational solvency*  However, there 
are customer service indicators with which MMD can measure its 
level of customer satisfaction.  Some of these indicators are 
(a) Inventory stockpiling by customers and (b) Vendor resupply 
fill-rate, and (c) Stock turn. 
a.   Imrentoizy Stockpiling 
Whenever customers lack confidence in their supplier's 
ability to fill their requirements in a timely fashion, customers 
seek alternative methods to insure that their needs are met.  One 
form of this insurance is "stockpiling", the ordering and storing 
of inventory on-site in excess of anticipated normal usage.  Not 
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only does "stockpiling" increase inventory costs, it also masks 
poor management practices. An absence of stockpiling would 
indicate customer confidence that the supplier can satisfy all 
the customer's requirements quickly and accurately. 
b.        Vendor Resupply Fill-Rate 
Another indicator to measure customer service level 
could be the resupply fill-rate that MMD receives from its 
vendors.  Fill-rate is the probability that a vendor will be able 
to fill an order with the requested items from its current stock 
(Ballou, 1992).  Fill-rate or service level can be expressed by 
the following formula: 
Expected number of items 
Fill-Rate/Service Level = 1 -  out of stock annually 
Total Annual Demand 
An item with a demand for 300 units and an expected out 
of stock quantity of 15 units would have a fill-rate of .95 or 95 
percent.  If MMD receives a high vendor resupply fill-rate, then 
MMD can pass those high fill-rate benefits directly to their 
customers in the form of lower inventory holding costs and rapid 
response time.  Since MMD's mission is to provide the highest 
possible level of customer service to its internal customers (the 
doctors, the nurses, etc.) and to its external customers - the 
patients, customer satisfaction can be measured as their ability 
to provide those customers with resupply service. 
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c.        Stock Turn 
A third indicator that SVMH can use to measure MMD's 
level of customer service is stock turn.  Stock turn measures how 
quickly or how slowly items are being issued from the warehouse 
relative to the average on-hand inventory, i.e., the stock usage 
rate.  Stock turn primarily measures the efficiencies of 
inventory investment.  As such it was originally designed to 
provide management with a quick ratio of inventory to sales or 
issues.  Stock turn is usually - calculated as a dollar value ratio 
of total issues made from stock for a given period of time to the 
average of the beginning and ending inventories for that same 
period of time.  For example, if MMD began the year with $450,000 
in inventory, issued $5,000,000 in stock, and ended the year with 
$550,000 in inventory, then the stock turn ratio was 10 to 1, a 
monthly stock turn of .83.  In this example, all of MMD's 
inventory (based on dollar value) "turns over" or is issued once 
every five weeks. A high stock turnover rate could indicate that 
MMD has not made a sufficiently large investment in their 
inventory levels and must continually reorder to meet customer 
demands. 
However, with a fixed level of investment, such as 
MMD's eight million dollar annual budget for demand-based medical 
supplies, stock turn could be used as a quasi-service indicator. 
In this case, a high stock turn would indicate that MMD is 
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stocking the appropriate mix of parts for its customers.  A low 
stock turnover rate could indicate that MMD's inventory 
investment is too large relative to its sales (issues) or MMD's 
inventory mix is not appropriate for all its customers' 
requirements from stock.  The customer is not "buying" the 
stocked inventory, either because MMD is stocking the wrong 
parts, MMD is stocking the right mix of parts but ordering an 
insufficient quantity to satisfy their customers' demands, or MMD 
is not reordering the demanded inventory in a timely fashion. 
Any of these three indicators viewed in isolation could 
lead to imprecise and contradictory conclusions.  By monitoring 
all three of these customer service indicators together, SVMH 
should have a fairly accurate snapshot of the level of customer 
satisfaction that MMD is providing. 
42 
III.  THE COSAL INVENTORY MODEL 
This chapter will discuss possible methods which the 
Department of the Navy (DON) can employ to meet the Department of 
Defense's (DOD) readiness goals.  It will also portray an 
historical perspective of the Navy's shipboard inventory 
management program and related measures of effectiveness.  The 
thesis will then discuss the development of the Coordinated 
Shipboard Allowance List (COSAL), its inventory model, called the 
Point Five FLSIP Plus (.5F+), and the model's relative 
effectiveness towards meeting DOD's readiness goals. 
A.   BACKGROUND 
1.   Methods for DOD to Increase Efficiency 
DOD can more effectively meet its readiness goals, maintain 
or achieve higher levels of readiness and increase efficiency 
despite its declining budget authority by either improving 
weapons systems reliability, increasing shipboard inventory 
effectiveness, or pursuing a combination of these two efforts. 
a.   Reliability and Maintainability 
Reliability is defined as the probability that a 
particular weapons system will operate satisfactorily within 
given parameters when used for a specified period of time in the 
environment and operating conditions under which it was designed 
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to function (Blanchard, 1992).  As the reliability of a weapons 
system increases, overall readiness increases. 
Maintainability refers to those characteristics of a 
system or product design pertaining to the ability to perform 
maintenance actions - both preventative and corrective.  The 
design should allow maintenance actions to be preformed easily, 
safely, accurately and economically.  Maintainability can be 
measured in terms of maintenance cost and maintenance time (time 
required to perform the maintenance, time between maintenance 
actions,etc).  Maintainability concepts and definitions used are 
as follows: (Blanchard, 1992) 
1. MTBF: mean time between failure, which measures the 
average elapsed time between component or system 
failures. 
2. MTBM: mean time between all maintenance actions, which 
includes both corrective and preventive maintenance. 
3. Met: mean corrective maintenance time.  Whenever a system 
fails, a variety of actions are required to restore that 
system to full operational status.  Those actions include 
detection, preparation, disassembly, maintenance, 
reassembly and final testing.  A corrective maintenance 
cycle consists of all these steps.  The mean corrective 
maintenance time is an average time required to complete 
an entire corrective maintenance cycle. 
4. Mpt: mean preventive maintenance time. Mpt is a similar 
concept as Met, but measures the time required to keep a 
system at its required level of performance.  Mpt is the 
average time required to complete an entire preventive or 
scheduled maintenance cycle.  During this time the item 
is not available for operation. 
5. M: mean active maintenance time, the mean or average time 
to perform both corrective and preventive maintenance 
actions per operating cycle, excluding logistics and 
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administrative delay time.  It is a function of both Mpt 
and Met. 
6. MDT: maintenance downtime, the total time a system is 
"down" for both preventive and corrective maintenance 
actions including any applicable logistics and 
administrative delay time.  "The mean value is calculated 
from the elapsed times for each function and the 
associated frequencies (similar to the approach used in 
determining M)" (Blanchard, 1992). 
b.       Weapons System Redesign 
To maximize the reliability of current weapons systems, 
DOD could invest its shrinking procurement dollars in system 
redesigns of those weapons systems with low reliability and 
maintainability ratios.  The goal of any weapons system redesign 
is to improve the reliability of the system by improving the 
reliability of the individual component parts.  These improved 
component parts would then be retrofitted to the current system, 
improving the overall reliability of that system.  This would 
increase the probability that the system would be available when 
needed. 
There are three measurements which can be used to 
determine this probability: Achieved Availability (Aa), Inherent 
Availability (A*), and Operational Availability (A0) .  Both Aa and 
A±  measure probabilities under ideal circumstances, assuming that 
all necessary support equipment (parts and tools) and maintenance 
personnel are readily available.  Both measurements exclude 
logistics and administrative delay time from their calculations. 
Aa measures MTBM relative to M, which includes preventive 
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maintenance. A±  measures MTBF relative to Met, which excludes 
preventive maintenance. 
A0  measures the probability that a particular weapons 
system, when used in its actual intended environment, will 
operate as designed. A0  measures MTBM relative to MDT.  Aa and A± 
measure the probability of operational availability of a weapons 
system in a perfect support environment and are used to evaluate 
the weapons system's designed capability. A0  measures the 
weapons system's probability of success under realistic 
conditions in the actual support environment and is used to 
measure actual capability. 
2.   Weapons Systems Reliability Improvements 
One option that DOD can use to meet their readiness goals 
and increase efficiency is to maximize the overall effectiveness 
of their weapons system's reliability.  To measure the 
effectiveness of component reliability improvements (and overall 
system reliability improvement), DOD could measure the A±  of the 
weapons system.  Inherent Availability (A±)   is the ratio of MTBF 
to MTBF plus Met as represented by the following formula: 
MTBF A.    =  
MTBF   +   Met 
By lengthening the MTBF of individual component parts of a 
weapons system through enhancing or improving the reliability of 
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those individual components, the A±  of that system also increases 
(Blanchard, 1992).  The longer the time between failures of a 
weapons system (the greater the "uptime"), the greater the 
availability, reliability and efficiency of that weapons system. 
By measuring the overall reliability of a weapons system before 
any financial investment had been made in increasing component 
reliability, and measuring the overall reliability of that same 
weapons system after the investment, an investment-to-reliability 
ratio could be evaluated from a cost-benefit perspective.  The 
goal would be to determine the actual cost of reliability 
improvements relative to the net increase in system reliability. 
The dollar value would then be evaluated against other 
alternative reliability improvement investments which yielded 
similar changes in system reliability, choosing the most cost 
effective alternative.  This option assumes that reliability 
improvements can be successfully integrated into current weapons 
systems and their components. 
3.   Shipboard Inventory Effectiveness Improvement 
A second option that DOD can use to meet readiness goals is 
to maximize the effectiveness of current shipboard inventory used 
to repair and minimize weapons system "downtime." By investing 
in an optimal mix of repair parts for shipboard inventory, a 
greater number of the needed repair parts will be available 
(stocked) and readily accessible. 
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When a system is not operational, the total time required to 
repair that system and return it to a fully functional status is 
the maintenance downtime or MDT of that system.  MDT is the mean 
active maintenance time (M), or average elapsed time needed to 
complete both preventive and corrective maintenance of the 
system, plus the sum of any logistics delay time (LDT) and 
administrative delay time (ADT) required to obtain all necessary 
repair parts.  Thus: 
MDT =  FT + LDT + ADT. 
When the necessary repair parts are available onboard ship, 
LDT and ADT are virtually eliminated.  Whenever LDT and ADT are 
eliminated,  MDT equals Tl.    MDT becomes the time spent preforming 
the actual maintenance on the system. 
Operational Availability (AJ is the probability that a 
system will operate in its intended operational environment when 
required. As such it is considered a major readiness indicator. 
Ao consists of uptime divided by uptime plus maintenance downtime 
or (MDT) . A,, can be represented by the following formula: 
_     MTBM 
°    ~     MTBM   + MDT 
Whenever MDT is decreased by reducing or eliminating LDT and ADT, 
Operational Availability (A,,) is increased (Blanchard, 1992) .  As 
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Ao increases, readiness increases.  By measuring the shipboard 
inventory effectiveness before and after the financial 
investment, the investment-to-gain/loss of effectiveness ratio 
can be evaluated to ensure an efficient utilization of resources. 
The Navy's newest COSAL inventory model, the .5F+, addresses this 
second option.  It is this inventory management program model 
which will be compared to SVMH's inventory management program. 
4.   Combination of Options 
DOD could finance a combination of both options.  Choosing 
the first option - improving reliability - would imply that 
either (1) the selected weapons systems had not achieved a 
sufficiently high degree of reliability during the design phase 
or (2) new and innovative technologies had been developed after 
introducing the weapons system which will improve their overall 
reliability.  Equipment or system upgrades should not be 
considered as reliability improvements.  Upgrades enhance, change 
or improve the performance capabilities of the weapons system, 
usually expanding their original mission. As such, the upgraded 
system can be materially and functionally different than the 
original system. 
When designing weapons systems, a variety of factors and 
tradeoffs are considered and evaluated.  DOD's policy regarding 
reliability and maintainability emphasizes system readiness, 
mission performance requirements, prevention of design 
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deficiencies and "developing robust systems, insensitive to the 
environments experienced throughout the system's life cycle and 
easily repaired under adverse conditions (DODINST 5000.2, 1991)." 
Reliability must be designed into the system to support 
readiness goals and objectives.  The predicted and actual failure 
rates of the weapons system are critical evaluative factors in 
selecting that weapons system.  If the system has an inherent 
"critical single point failure mode" which cannot be eliminated, 
then reliability requires that redundancies be built-in or the 
system is made "insensitive to the cause of the failure (DODINST 
5000.2, 1991)." 
All component parts of the weapons system are subject to 
reliability testing.  The overall reliability of any weapons 
system is a function of the reliability of each component part. 
By conducting a configuration breakdown analysis of all the 
assemblies, subassemblies and component parts, an overall 
reliability factor for the weapons system can be determined. 
Reliability design tests and demonstrations continue 
throughout the weapon system's design phase until the production 
approval phase or Milestone III of the System Acquisition Phases. 
At that point the design is somewhat "frozen." Before entering 
the next phase of the weapon system's life cycle all customer or 
user requirements for reliability must have either been satisfied 
or waived during Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E) 
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(Dillard, 1995).  Before the weapon system is approved for 
production, all test results and design corrections from IOT&E 
are reviewed and verified.  Any previous failures due to 
defective or faulty component parts should have been corrected 
through quality control.  During the weapon system's initial 
deployment, the reliability objectives are again verified.  These 
extensive testing procedures are necessary to ensure the highest 
reliability prior to deployment. 
DOD's policies and procedures are designed to obtain the 
greatest system reliability at the lowest cost.  Improvements to 
reliability during the design phase are generally less costly 
than those initiated after the system has matured.  Figure 5 
illustrates this point.  A reliability-to-cost ratio can be 
developed by comparing an increase in reliability to its 
associated investment costs.  Tracking the reliability-to-cost 
ratio during the weapons system's initial design phases and its 
mature phases will show when the most cost effective investment 
should be made. 
An increase in the overall reliability of a weapon system 
made during its design phase is represented by movement from R^ 
to R2 along the Reliability axis.  This change in the absolute 
value of the Reliability is delta r. A similar increase in the 
absolute value of the Reliability is also made during the mature 





Reliability to Cost Ratios 
R2 - Rj = r increase in Reliability Percent R4 - R3 = r increase in Reliability Percent 
Cd - C, = y Dollars — Cost of Investment 
Figure 5.   Reliability Increase to Investment Cost Ratio 
C2 - C, = x Dollars — Cost of Investment 
investment costs necessary to obtain the same increase in system 
reliability is not the same.  The investment cost of C3 to C4 
(shown as y dollars) is greater than the investment costs from Cj. 
to C2 (shown as x dollars).  Reliability improvements are less 
expensive in the design phase than the mature phase. 
Option one addresses reliability improvements for weapons 
systems after deployment.  When a weapon system is deployed, it 
has met all customer required reliability factors.  It is close 
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to its reliability design limits.  Additional investment in 
reliability at this stage is usually not cost effective. 
Option two addresses the issue of co-locating the necessary 
repair parts close to the equipment they support.  Repair parts 
are required for both preventative and corrective maintenance 
actions.  Option two does not propose increasing the quantity of 
repair parts in inventory, but rather altering the mix of those 
parts.  The greater the reliability of the weapon system, the 
greater the MTBF of that weapon system and the smaller the 
overall usage rate of those repair parts.  But maintenance 
actions, whether scheduled or not, will still be required.  If 
the weapon system is currently at sub-optimal reliability or new 
and innovative technologies have been developed permitting the 
retrofitting of reliability improvements, reliability gains after 
deployment are generally more expensive than co-locating required 
repair parts.  With limited resources and declining budgets, DOD 
would likely have to trade-off gains in reliability against stock 
piling spares.  DOD could not fully fund either option. 
5.   COSAL Model Development 
Navies have always needed a method for rationally trading 
off bullets, butter and black oil for sustainability.  Since a 
ship can not carry, nor can a country afford, all possible repair 
parts for all ships, some type of mathematical model is needed to 
determine the mix of parts and the quantities that should be 
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procured, warehoused, transported and placed on board. The goal 
of any inventory allowance model should be to maintain or improve 
both fleet readiness and effectiveness while minimizing the 
shipboard inventory levels and associated costs. 
a.   Needs and Benefits of the COSAL 
In December 1956, the Coordinated Shipboard Allowance 
List (COSAL) Program was implemented to standardize qualification 
criteria for procuring and stowing spare parts onboard ships. 
The COSAL is a publication containing all the reported weapons 
systems and equipment installed onboard individual ships and 
their maintenance significant components or piece parts. All 
equipment and piece part items are assigned an item 
identification number for ease of reordering and repair. 
National Item Identification Numbers (NIINs) are also assigned to 
all repair and consumable items.  The COSAL lists all storeroom 
repair parts stocked onboard to support and maintain weapons 
systems and equipment by NUN. 
Prior to implementing the COSAL concept, each work 
center on the ship maintained its own inventory and storeroom of 
repair parts to support its equipment and weapons systems. As a 
result, there was little information regarding availability of 
individual parts across work centers.  Technicians spent an 
inordinate amount of time requisitioning, tracking, receiving, 
storing and maintaining their individual supplies (Neelley, 
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1965) .  Inventory consolidation eliminated unnecessary- 
duplications of repair parts.  This enhanced overall efficiency 
and lowered costs.  COSALs are hull-tailored to individual ships, 
based on the ship's reported equipment configurations.  Since the 
COSAL lists all repair parts authorized to be carried onboard the 
ship, a COSAL inventory model was required to maximize the 
inventory's effectiveness based on actual demand and predicted 
failures while satisfying both budget and onboard space 
constraints. 
b.        Initial COSAL Inventory Requirements 
In addition to considering both money and storage 
constraints, the inventory model should identify those parts most 
commonly needed to repair the ship's weapons systems and 
supporting equipment.  By analyzing preliminary statistical data, 
the Allowance List of the original COSAL inventory model included 
any repair part predicted to be needed one or more times within a 
ninety-day period.  If a repair part did not have a minimum usage 
rate of one demand in ninety days, it could be carried as an 
insurance item.  Insurance items are repair parts for equipment 
considered vital to the ship's primary mission or vital to the 
safety or welfare of the crew.  However, insurance items were not 
stocked unless they were needed at least once during the past 
eight quarters (Neelley, 1965).  The goal of the COSAL model was 
to provide a storeroom inventory management system capable of 
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satisfying ninety percent of a ship's demands for repair parts 
during a ninety-day endurance period (OPNAVINST 4441.12B). 
c.        Value of an Effective COSAL Inventory 
To significantly contribute to fleet readiness, a ship 
must be able to quickly repair its degraded or inoperative 
weapons systems.  The most expeditious method to complete these 
repairs would be placing both the technical expertise and an 
inventory of repair parts onboard individual ships.  Identifying 
and stocking those repair parts must be the mission of any 
inventory management program.  The COSAL identifies those weapon 
systems which the ship is capable of maintaining and repairing 
onboard, and lists all the component parts of those weapon 
systems.  The inventory model determines which repair parts 
should be stocked in the ship's storerooms, the most readily 
accessible level of DOD inventory. 
By accurately identifying and stocking those repair 
parts, the ship's maintenance and repair capabilities increase, 
stock outs decrease, and overall material readiness improves. 
d.        COSAL's Measures of Effectiveness 
To determine whether the COSAL's inventory model 
accurately predicts which repair parts should be stocked for 
shipboard use, DON uses three methods to measure the model's 
effectiveness:  Net Effectiveness, Gross Effectiveness and COSAL 
Effectiveness.  The first two methods, Net and Gross 
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Effectiveness, measure the ability of the ship to provide 
previously identified, stocked parts to its internal customers. 
The third method measures the model's ability to predict overall 
customer demand. 
(1)  Net Effectiveness.  Net Effectiveness 
measures the ship's fill rate in satisfying customers' demands 
for authorized repair parts relative to the storeroom inventory 
availability of those same authorized repair parts.  The formula 
for Net Effectiveness is: 
Net Effectiveness   =     Total Issues From Stock 
Total Demands for Stocked Items 
Net Effectiveness was designed to directly measure a ship's 
ability to issue and reorder authorized inventory parts. 
(2)     Gross Effectiveness.  Gross Effectiveness 
measures the relationship between the ship's ability to issue and 
reorder authorized parts and the inventory model's ability to 
predict customer needs.  Gross Effectiveness measures the fill 
rate of the customers' demands relative to any repair part, 
whether authorized for stock or not. The Gross Effectiveness 
formula is: 
Gross Effectiveness   =    Total Issues From Stock 
Total Demands for Any Item 
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Net and Gross Effectiveness goals have been established at 85 
percent and 65 percent respectively (OPNAVINST 4441.12B). 
(3) Need for unique measurements.  While Net and 
Gross Effectiveness goals are important, both are dependent upon 
influences external to the model itself.  For example, failure of 
a ship to expeditiously reorder a part upon issue lowers Net and 
Gross Effectiveness if that part is.needed again.  However, 
reordering that same part when issued does not guarantee a higher 
Net or Gross Effectiveness; the part may not be needed again. 
Other externalities which impact effectiveness percentages 
include system stock availability, long lead times associated 
with some routine stock replenishment actions, and transportation 
time for reordered parts to the ship. 
(4) COSAL Effectiveness.  DON recognized the the 
shortcomings of using only Net and Gross Effectiveness to 
accurately measure and predict inventory effectivness. A 
measurement was needed which determined the responsiveness of the 
model itself to actual demands.  Both Net and Gross Effectiveness 
formulas use issues from stock as a criterion.  By factoring out 
issues from stock, their influence would be negated, leaving only 
demands for any item relative to demands for model identified 
stock items.  This third DON tool directly measures the 
effectiveness of the COSAL's inventory model in identifying and 
stocking repair parts for individual ships.  That measurement is 
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COSAL Effectiveness, the ratio of the number of demands for an 
item identified by the model to the number of demands for any 
item, independent of inventory qualification criteria.  The 
formula is derived by dividing Gross Effectiveness by Net 
Effectiveness as follows: 
COSAL Effectiveness =     Gross Effectiveness 
Net Effectiveness 
substituting for Gross and Net Effectiveness, 
Stock Issues 
Demand for Any Item 
COSAL Effectiveness  = 
Stock Issues 
Demand for Stock Item 
Factoring Stock Issues, the resulting formula measures how well 
the model predicts customers' demands (OPNAVINST 4441.12B). 
COSAL Effectiveness  =  Total Demands For Stocked Items 
Total Demands For Any Item 
COSAL effectiveness contrasts forecasted demand 
with actual demand.  It is not dependent on stock availability, 
either locally or system wide. A COSAL inventory model is 
considered more effective as the total number of demands for 
stocked items approaches the total number of demands for any 
item. A ratio of one (an effectiveness of one hundred percent) 
would mean that any demand for a repair part had been anticipated 
and identified by the model as a demand for a stock item. 
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Because of budget and space constraints, a COSAL Effectiveness 
goal of one hundred percent is neither practical nor realistic. 
To maximize fleet readiness and effectiveness, an 
efficient inventory management program must also minimize 
shipboard inventory levels and costs.  Until allocative 
efficiency has been achieved, improvements to inventory 
management programs can be made.  To measure the efficiency of 
modifications to shipboard inventory programs, the effectiveness 
results must be compared before and after implementing of those 
changes. 
B.   EARLY COSAL INVENTORY MODELS 
This section begins with a discussion of what kinds of 
repair parts constitute a typical shipboard storeroom inventory 
and what items are non-storeroom items.  How the range and depth 
of storeroom items are calculated is then addressed, followed by 
a brief introduction to two of the early inventory models and 
their mathematical computations - the FLSIP and MODFLSIP 
inventory models. 
1.   Shipboard Inventory Allowance Listings 
With the requirements for a COSAL established and a method 
for measuring the effectiveness of that COSAL designed, all that 
remains is developing a mathematical model to calculate the 
repair parts inventories to be stocked in the ship's storerooms. 
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In actuality, shipboard inventories are composed of a 
variety of items "brought onboard" for different reasons or 
justifications other than mathematical modeling. 
a.   Consumable and Repairable Repair Parts 
All repair parts can be categorized as either 
consumables or repairables.  Consumables are low cost, low 
variability items, which are "consumed" after issue, either 
through use or incorporation into a piece of equipment. As a 
general rule, consumables are not "repaired" when "broken" but 
discarded.  Typical examples of consumables include transistors, 
resistors, washers, and packing. 
Repairables are usually high cost, complex items, which 
can be repaired when "broken". Based on the skill level and test 
equipment required, some repairables can be repaired onboard ship 
while others can only be repaired at depots ashore. Examples of 
repairables include circuit cards, some pumps, motors and engines 
(NAVSUP 553, 1991). 
Jb.   Storeroom Inventory Composition 
A shipboard inventory allowance listing consists of 
repair part maintenance items for stocking at both storeroom and 
non-storeroom locations.  For budget analysis purposes, location 
of the inventory does not impact the financial allocation. 
(1)  Storeroom inventory items.  Shipboard 
storeroom inventory items are physically located in the ship's 
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storerooms.  For data research purposes, storeroom inventory 
items will be classified based on their stocking justifications 
as either Storeroom Items (SRIs), Allowance or Technical Override 
items (TORs) or Area of Interest items (AOIs).    SRIs are those 
repair parts which are stocked as inventory, based on the results 
of a mathematical inventory model.  They are designated as either 
insurance items or demand based items. 
TORs are stocked regardless of the model 
projections as exception items, either because of weapons systems 
reliability interest, planned maintenance or necessity for the 
safety or welfare of the ship's crew.  Typical TORs include 
Readiness Based Sparing items (RBS), Preventitive Maintenance 
System items (PMS), and Safety items. 
While RBS has been categorized as a TOR, it is 
really another mathematical approach for inventory sparing. 
Briefly, an Operational Availability or A«, goal is established 
for a weapons system by the weapons system sponsor.  Through a 
marginal analysis allocation model, "the RBS process—provide(s) 
the range, depth and location of spare parts to support required 
readiness objectives at the least cost given the reliability and 
maintainability characteristics of a (specific) system/equipment" 
(NAVICP-M, 1995).  RBS matches spares and readiness objectives to 
financial constraints. 
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AOIs items are those items which have been 
designated, usually by the Hardware Systems Command or 
engineering actions, as necessary for material readiness and 
reliability concerns of specified weapons systems.  AOIs are 
stocked in accordance with those concerns (SPCCINST 4441.170A). 
(2)  Non-storeroom inventory items.  Typical Non- 
Storeroom items are:  Operating Space Items (OSI), Maintenance 
Assistance Modules (MAMs) , and Ready Service Spares (RSS).  OSIs 
are items required by both maintenance and technical personnel to 
perform maintenance actions.  Typically, OSIs are items such as 
special tools and test equipment, located in the work space but 
designated on the COSAL as part of the ship's parts allowance. 
MAMs are specialized repair parts which act as test equipment, 
designed to "plug-and-play" to locate and isolate system faults. 
RSS are actual spare parts, physically located in the work space 
to expedite system repairs. 
2.  Requirements of the Inventory Model 
The inventory model used to manage SRIs must be able to 
exclude from consideration any repair part which is beyond the 
ship's ability to use, either due to its physical size or the 
ship's lack of technical and maintenance expertise.  All repair 
parts are coded with Source, Maintenance and Recoverability 
(SM&R) codes to identify those items whose maintenance 
requirements may exceed a specific ship's repair capabilities. 
63 
The model must read this code and exclude that item from 
consideration for the ship's storeroom. 
Additionally, the model must determine the appropriate range 
(variety of different items carried) and depth (quantity of 
individual items) of shipboard inventory allowances for repair 
parts.  While range is normally dependent on the variety of 
installed equipment, depth is generally restricted to a Minimum 
Replacement Unit (MRU). A MRU is the lowest repair element of 
the equipment's configuration necessary to complete authorized 
repairs on the equipment to return it to full operational status. 
MRUs vary based on the complexity and technical specifications of 
the equipment.  For example, a pump might require two o-rings as 
part of the maintenance process.  The two o-rings constitute a 
single MRU.  On the other hand, the electronic technicians may 
not be authorized to disassemble and repair an electronic circuit 
card for the ship's radar system, only remove and replace it. 
That circuit card would be the MRU. 
The ship's allowance for identified MRUs also depends on the 
population of equipment that contain the MRU.  In the example of 
the o-rings, if there are several applications which require 
those o-rings for maintenance, then an allowance quantity is 
calculated based on the population of installed o-rings, 
maintenance schedules, equipment failure rates, average time for 
resupply, etc. 
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To support the COSAL's objectives, the Fleet Logistics 
Support Improvement Program (FLSIP) inventory model was 
developed.  The FLSIP model directly relates an item's projected 
failure or its predicted usage rate to the inventory carried to 
meet the items's predicted shipboard demand. 
3.   Threshold Qualifications 
The model incorporates into its calculations the repair 
part's Usage Rate, a numerical value representing the predicted 
demand rate for an individual repair part.  Usage rates determine 
whether a repair part meets minimum "threshold" values to be 
included in the COSAL's Allowance List.  They are calculated 
using the following formula: (SPCCINST 4441.170A) 
Usage Rate = Population * Best Replacement Factor 
4 
Population is the number of times that a particular 
component is installed in any onboard equipment, i.e., how many 
times a specific item appears in all installed equipment and 
weapons systems.  The Best Replacement Factor (BRF) is an 
exponentially smoothed, annually forecasted replacement rate.  It 
is based on both the initial failure rate data provided by the 
contractor or manufacturer and annual updates using historical 
demand data collected through the Material Maintenance Management 
(3M) system for individual components.  If the part is a new 
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item, i.e., it has been in the system for less than two years, 
then the model uses only the BRF value provided by the contractor 
or manufacturer.  The Navy uses "level only" exponential 
smoothing techniques for computing and forecasting BRF values. 
That general format is: 
New BRF = a  x (New Avg- Rate of Demand)   + (1 - a) x (Old BRF) 
The alpha value is a smoothing weight factor whose value may 
vary each year based on population size and "BRF trending" 
(increasing or decreasing).  If the demand for an item is 
trending (NAVICP-M uses an application of the Kendall ws" 
statistic to determine relevancy of trending), then NAVICP-M uses 
a four quarter moving average demand rather than exponential 
smoothing.  If no trend is detected or if the trend is less than 
the threshold value, then NAVICP-M uses an alpha value of 0.10 
(NAVSUP 553, 1991) .  A small alpha value emphasizes previously 
forecasted demands relative to more recent observations; a larger 
alpha value places a greater emphasis on the more recent demand 
observations.  Small alpha values provide stable predictions, 
unaffected by spikes in demand (Ballou, 1992).  Both exponential 
smoothing and moving averages are time sensitive and rely on 
accurately reported data and proper analysis. 
Once the BRF has been calculated, it is multiplied by the 
Population and divided by four to derive the expected usage rate 
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for a ninety-day endurance period.  The resulting Usage Rate (UR) 
becomes a qualifying threshold for including or excluding that 
repair part from the COSAL's allowance list of repair parts. 
4.   Evolution of Inventory Models 
a.   Point 25 FLSIP Inventory Model   (.25 FLSIP) 
One of the earliest models developed was referred to as 
the .25 FLSIP model because it set the predicted Usage Rate (UR) 
threshold at one failure in four years to achieve the CNO's 
stocking level objective of .25.  For computational purposes, the 
threshold is calculated on the basis of one failure in sixteen 
quarters.  This established a threshold value of .0625.  URs are 
then divided into three possible outcomes relative to their 
threshold values: (1) UR less than .0625, (2) UR greater than or 
equal to .0625 but less than 1.0000, and (3) UR greater than or 
equal to 1.0000. 
(1) UR less than .0625.  If the usage rate 
threshold is less than .0625, i.e., the predicted failure rate is 
less than one in sixteen quarters, then the item is excluded as 
an allowed SRI.1 
(2) UR between .0625 and 1.0000.  If the 
predicted usage rate is greater than or equal to .0625 but less 
than 1.0000 (four or more failures in four quarters), then the 
1CNO Exclusion Criterion was initially set at .15 demands per year 
or a UR of .0375.  In 1973, to reduce costs, the criterion was changed 
to .25 demands per year and a UR of .0625 respectively. 
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item qualifies for further consideration as an SRI insurance 
item.  Insurance items are stocked if they support equipment 
vital to the ship's primary mission.  In an attempt to qualify 
the subjective nature of insurance items, mission criticality 
codes (MCC codes) were assigned to selected vital equipment. 
These codes establish a relationship between the ship's 
equipment, mission of the platform and material readiness by 
describing the relative importance of various equipment to the 
ship's mission. A military essentiality code (MEC) describes the 
essentiality of an individual part to the end item or equipment. 
An item mission essentiality code (IMEC) describes the item's 
relationship to the mission.  If a repair part meets the 
threshold requirements for insurance and has the appropriate MEC 
or IMEC codes, then the item is included as a SRI insurance item. 
The SRI insurance item's allowance quantity is one each or one 
MRU, if the MRU is greater than one.  Insurance items based on 
these criticality data were designed to increase the ship's 
contribution to fleet readiness by raising the COSAL's 
effectiveness and improving the shipboard inventory of repair 
parts.  Without continually validating and updating MECs and 
IMECs, relative to individual ships, efficiency improvements are 
only effective in the short run. 
(3)  UR equal to or greater than 1.0000.  If the 
predicted usage rate or threshold value is equal to or greater 
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than 1.0000 (four or more failures in four quarters), then the 
item is carried as a demand-based SRI. The allowance quantity 
for the demand-based SRIs are computed based on their expected 
level of demand. 
Categories of items which are excluded from UR 
criteria include Technical Overrides (TORs), Area of Interest 
Items (AOIs), and non-storeroom inventory items such as Operating 
Space Items (OSIs), Maintenance Assistance Modules (MAMs), and 
Ready Service Spares (RSS). 
Jb.   Modified FLSIP Inventory Model 
The next refinement to the COSAL Allowance List was a 
modified FLSIP model or MODFLSIP.  MODFLSIP attempted to improve 
material readiness by further quantifying the insurance SRIs in 
regards to their IMEC codes with additional qualification 
criteria.  Selected IMEC coded items, items considered "more 
critical," had to meet a lower predicted UR threshold to qualify 
as an insurance SRI.  That lower threshold is set at .1 FLSIP, 
one failure in ten years or a .025 usage rate.  Their allowance 
quantity remained one MRU.  However, if the item's annual demand 
is between 2 and 4, then an allowance depth of two is authorized. 
MODFLSIP maintained the .0625 usage rate and allowance 
requirements for the remaining "less critical" IMEC codes. All 
other aspects of the .25 FLSIP model remained unchanged. 
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C.   POINT FIVE FLSIP PLUS (.5F+) INVENTORY MODEL 
1.   Test Platform Considerations 
Given the continuing need to reduce both the quantity and 
cost of inventories while maintaining readiness levels, a revised 
model was developed beginning in 1991.  The goal was to reduce 
the number of repair parts or NIINs carried by 10 percent and 
overall inventory costs by 20 percent while maintaining or 
improving readiness levels. 
Approximately every five to seven years the Navy schedules 
its ships for an Integrated Logistics Overhaul (ILO).  As part of 
that process, a ship's new COSAL is printed with all its reported 
configuration changes.  The current configuration of all the 
ship's weapons systems, supporting equipment, and storeroom 
inventories are validated against this new COSAL at the ILO site. 
If weapons systems are upgraded or replaced, NIINs which are no 
longer required to support those weapons systems are off loaded. 
If new weapons systems are added, new inventory items are added 
to support the new equipment.  To minimize the administrative 
costs associated with changing out shipboard inventories, changes 
requiring significant on-loading and off-loading of storeroom 
items are only conducted during a regularly scheduled ILO. 
The USS Roberts, FFG-37, had previously been scheduled for 
an ILO in mid 1991. As part of the preparation for that ILO, a 
new, updated MODFLSIP COSAL was prepared.  The ROBERTS' COSAL was 
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chosen as the platform to test the new inventory model, the Point 
Five FLSIP Plus .5F+. 
2. Evolutionary Structure of the .5F+ Inventory Model 
The Navy's Inventory Control Point, Mechanicsburg (NAVICP-M) 
developed the criteria for the .5F+ model.  The model began as a 
.5 FLSIP (.5F) model.  Based on the results of model simulation, 
the .5F model evolved into the .5F+ model.  The remainder of this 
section will discuss the criteria for the .5F model, compare the 
results of the .5F model to the previous model (MODFLSIP), and 
using model simulation techniques, evaluate the .5F's impact on 
material readiness. As a result of those simulations, the .5F+ 
model was developed.  This section continues with a discussion of 
the data sets used to develop the "Plus" portion of the .5F+, and 
concludes with the business rules used to add inventory items to 
the model.  Section D will discuss and evaluate the results of 
the .5F+, comparing it to both the .5F and MODFLSIP.  That 
section will conclude with a discussion of the efficiency of the 
MODFLSIP, .5F, and .5F+ inventory models. 
3. Basic Model - Point Five FLSIP (.5F) 
The .5F model revised the MODFLSIP threshold criteria from 
one failure in four years to one failure in two years.  Any 
repair part whose usage rate is less than one in two years, i.e., 
a usage rate or threshold value less than .125, no longer 
qualified for stocking as an allowed repair part.  If the UR was 
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greater than .125 but less than 1.0000 and had the appropriate 
MEC and IMEC codes, then the item qualified as an insurance SRI. 
If the UR was equal to or greater than 1.0000, then the item was 
stocked as a demand-based SRI, with an allowance quantity based 
on its expected level of demand.  Like the .25 FLSIP and 
MODFLSIP, TORs, AOIs, and OSIs are excluded for UR threshold 
criteria.  The .5F model, like previous models, was designed to 
reduce only the SRIs. 
4.   MODFLSIP as the Working Base Model 
ROBERTS had originally been outfitted with a MODFLSIP COSAL. 
Using all reported equipment modifications, additions, and 
deletions, NAVICP-M created a new MODFLSIP COSAL for ROBERTS. 
This latest COSAL contained approximately 125,000 maintenance 
significant repair part NIINs installed onboard.  From this 
listing of potential allowance candidates, the MODFLSIP model 
produced a Stock Number Sequence List or SNSL.  The SNSL lists 
all NIINs that qualify for an allowance and their nomenclature, 
unit of issue and allowance quantity.  The MODFLSIP model reduced 
the 125,000 potential candidates to 12,045 NIINs. 
The results are shown by category in Table I.  Quantity 
onboard amounts represent the range (single count NIINs) and the 
dollar values represent the depth (sum of the range times their 
allowance quantities times their MRU times unit price). 
72 
TABLE I. ROBERTS' MODFLSIP Storeroom Allowances 
CATEGORY QUANTITY ONBOARD DOLLAR VALUE 
AOI 841 $    124,000 
TOR 2,077 $  2,759,000 
SRI 9,127 $  3,279,000 
TOTALS 12,045 $  6,162,000 
Since OSI NIINs are part of COSAL inventory allowance, but not 
part of storeroom allowances, they are not reported as part of 
this table.  USS Roberts' COSAL authorized 765 OSI NIINs with a 
net value of $4,237,000.  The ROBERTS' MODFLSIP COSAL inventory 
established a working baseline for comparing any cost savings 
generated first by the .5F model and later the .5F+ model. 
Using the new threshold criteria for the .5F inventory 
model, a new allowance list was generated.  The results of 
applying the new .5F model criteria to ROBERTS' COSAL are shown 
in Table II.  The number of SRI repair parts allowed under 
MODFLSIP for ROBERTS was reduced from 9,127 to 5,532, a net 
change of 3,595 line items.  The overall SRI inventory value was 
also reduced from $3.28 million to $1.04 million for a net cost 
avoidance of $2.24 million.  NIINs which qualified for an 
allowance under MODFLSIP as AOIs, TORs, or OSIs items also 
qualified under the .5F model and were not reduced or deleted 
from the model {Point Paper, 1992). 
73 
TABLE II. ROBERTS'.5F Storeroom Allowances 
CATEGORY QUANTITY ONBOARD DOLLAR VALUE 
AOI 841 $    124,000 
TOR 2,077 $  2,759,000 
SRI 5,532 $  1,037,000 
TOTALS 8,450 $  3,920,000 
5.   Model Effectiveness Testing 
The .5F storeroom inventory was then processed through the 
Fleet Material Support Office's (FMSO) model simulation program, 
using the actual demands that ROBERTS had submitted for the 
previous twelve quarters.  Using the same criteria that had been 
established for Gross Effectiveness, the new percentages were 
recorded as Model Effectiveness.  As shown in Table III, if 
ROBERTS' storerooms contained only those NIINs that qualified 
under the new ,5F threshold values, Gross Effectiveness for the 
thirty-six month window would have dropped from 56.9 percent 


















MODFLSIP 3,743 2,133 56.9 % $ 6.16 
.5 FLSIP 3,743 1,762 47.1 % $ 3.92 
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under MODFLSIP to 47.1 percent under .5F.  Using Model / Gross 
Effectiveness as a surrogate measure for material readiness, 
Table III illustrates that inventory costs had been reduced, but 
at the expense of material readiness.   Using only the last four 
quarters of data (the normal reporting period for effectiveness 
measurements) a similar reduction in effectiveness was recorded. 
As Table IV shows, inventory costs dropped from $6.16 million to 
$3.92 million and effectiveness was reduced from 61.8% to 41.1%. 
















COST IN  | 
MILLIONS  | 
MODFLSIP 1,765 1,092 61.8 % $ 6.16 
.5 FLSIP 1,765 725 41.1 % $ 3.92 
As both Tables III and IV illustrate, compared to MODFLSIP, 
whether the .5F inventory model is used for twelve months of 
demand or thirty-six months of demand, as the number of SRIs and 
the corresponding cost of inventory decrease, Model Effectiveness 
as a surrogate measure for readiness also decreases.  Increasing 
the threshold qualification value of ROBERTS' SRIs significantly 
decreased ROBERTS' material readiness.  As Table IV also shows, 
although the .5F threshold produced $2.24 million in potential 
savings, readiness decreased 20.7 % over four quarters.  To 
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offset this loss of shipboard material readiness, savings 
realized from the smaller .5F storeroom inventory would have to 
be re-invested in readiness programs that would directly 
contribute to higher shipboard readiness, an investment in 
weapons systems reliability improvements sufficient to offset the 
20.7 % loss of readiness. 
Figure 6 illustrates the results of changing inventory 
models and the impact on inventory efficiencies between MODFLSIP 
and .5F.  In this example CUM represents the maximum Gross 
Effectiveness achievable with MODFLSIP.  If ROBERTS MODFLSIP 
inventory was technically efficient, then its position along PPFM 
would be represented by point TEM.  If ROBERTS MODFLSIP inventory 
was inefficient, then its position would be Operating Point OPM. 
The .5F inventory, with its higher threshold values and 
corresponding lower dollar inventory mix, would shift both 
ROBERTS' curves to the left, from PPFM to PPFF and CUM to CUP. 
After the shift, ' ROBERTS inventory could be allocatively 
efficient (point AEF), technically efficient (point TEP) or 
inefficient (point OPF) . 
When comparing MODFLSIP to .5F on the basis of Tables III 
and IV, no conclusions can be drawn regarding the location of 
ROBERTS' operating position with either inventory mix.  Using 
only the data presented so far, the operating point with MODFLSIP 
could be allocatively efficient at AEM, only technically 
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Parts Mix 2 
Inventory Efficiency Reduction 
AEM  = Allocative Efficiency, MODFLSIP          AEy 
TEM  = Technical Efficiency, MODFLSIP TEp 
OPM  = Operating Point, MODFLSIP OPF 
PPFM = Production Possibility, MODFLSIP         PPFF 
CUM  = Consumers Utility, MODFLSIP CUF 
AUocative Efficiency, .5FLSIP 
Technical Efficiency, .5 FLSIP 
Operating Point. .5FLSIP 
■■ Production Possibility, .5 FLSIP 
= Consumers Utility, .5 FLSIP 
Figure 6. .5 FLSIP Inventory Efficiency- 
efficient such as at TEM/ or neither such as OPM.  The same is 
true with the .5F model and potential operating points AEP, TEP, 
and OPF.  Thus there is no basis for indicating that one model is 
more efficient than the other. 
The drop in effectiveness from MODFLSIP to .5F is expected, 
given the corresponding drop in inventory investment.  If the 
effectiveness had been unaffected or had even increased with the 
change from MODFLSIP to .5F, and the inventory investment still 
dropped, then we could conclude that MODFLSIP was definitely not 
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allocatively efficient and that the .5F was in some sense more 
efficient.  But this did not happen.  That neither model obtained 
65% Gross Effectiveness also does not provide any information 
about their allocative or technical efficiency.  It could well be 
that the highest possible effectiveness with the inventory 
investments of both models (represented by AEM and AEF 
respectively) is less than 65%. 
6.   Use of Demand-Based Data 
Reducing the quantity of SRIs, as in the .5F model, clearly 
lowered ROBERTS shipboard level of material readiness and overall 
contribution to national security.  To increase ROBERTS 
efficiency, and regain or improve the level of readiness, i.e., 
move closer towards allocative efficiency, the $2.24 million 
savings had to be re-invested in fleet readiness.  While weapons 
system reliability improvements are an investment alternative, as 
previously discussed, they are not the most cost effective. 
Another option is improving the effectiveness of the .5F 
inventory itself.  Since Gross Effectiveness is a function of 
customer demands, by incorporating additional customer demand 
based SRIs NIINs into the .5F model, NIINs not captured by 
previous models, the .5F inventory would satisfy more customer 
demands.  The more customer demands satisfied by stocked items, 
the closer the ROBERTS inventory would move towards its 
allocative efficiency tangency point. 
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One common feature of all previous FLSIP models was that 
they only used demand data peripherally.  Fleet-wide demands were 
used to annually update BRFs and some SRI insurance item 
calculations, but neither model used class or ship-type specific 
demand data as a major input.  While the COSAL was hull-tailored 
to individual ships, the Allowance List was not.  NAVICP-M chose 
to directly incorporate actual demands from similar ship-types 
into the .5F inventory model as additive data inputs without 
exponential smoothing.  This additive data facilitates the WPLUS" 
of the .5F+ inventory model.  By using specified demand data, 
NAVICP-M made a paradigm shift to a more customer-oriented 
approach. 
7.   Construction of the .5F+ Demand-Based Data Set 
To use current demand-based inputs as part of the inventory 
parameters for ROBERTS's COSAL, a database was designed which 
grouped the ROBERTS with fourteen similar FFG's. All had been 
constructed by the same shipyard and had similar equipment and 
weapons system configurations.  This fifteen ship subgroup, or 
flight, was treated as a separate class of ships.  Demand data 
from all fifteen ships for the previous four years was downloaded 
from the 3M System database files.  This database represented 
sixty ship-years of data, with a range of 8,769 demand-based 
NIINs and a net value of $5.15 million.  This data file became 
the .5F+ demand-based data set. 
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8.   Application of .5F+ Demand-Based Data Set 
NIINs selected for this group represented potential demand 
based insurance items.  Based on demand levels, they could be 
added back to specific storerooms as demand based SRIs.  Because 
of budget constraints, business rules for selecting qualifying 
NIINs from the new database had to be developed.  These rules 
traded budget dollars for frequency of demand.  The criterion for 
selection from this database was established as eight demands in 
four years across all fifteen ships. 
Any allowance candidate whose UR failed the .5F threshold 
criteria was then compared to this newly created demand-based 
data file.  If a NUN appeared on both the ROBERTS' failed .5F 
threshold allowance candidate list and the demand-based data set 
and had experienced a minimum of eight demands in a four year 
period, then that NUN was "added-back" to ROBERTS' storeroom 
inventory allowance creating a .5F+ inventory.  Demand could have 
been registered by one ship, submitting eight requisitions or 
eight ships submitting a single demand or any combination.  Of 
the 8,769 NIINs available in the data set, 988 NIINs valued at 
$640,758 were "added-back" to ROBERTS as SRIs using the eight 
demands in four years criteria. 
As discussed in Chapter II, casualty reports or CASREPs are 
one of the major material readiness measurements that the Navy 
reports to the JCS. A CASREP reports a serious degradation in a 
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ship's mission capabilities.  Because of the impact that CASREPs 
have on fleet readiness and national security, CASREP demands are 
coded differently than "normal" demands.  Likewise CASREP demands 
are processed separately, requiring the highest possible 
visibility.  Since CASREPs are so critical, a second demand-based 
data set was created of only CASREP demands.  This CASREP demand 
database was created using CASREP data submissions recorded in 
the 3M System files for the previous 24 months from the same 
flight of ships.  Potential SRI add-back candidates for ROBERTS 
were screened using a different business qualification rule of 
three CASREP demands in two years.  Of the 822 NIINs valued at 
$2.03 million in this data set, 74 NIINs valued at $344,000 were 
"added-back" to ROBERTS SRI inventory using the three demands in 
two years criteria. 
D.   MODEL OUTCOME / RESULTS 
By "adding-back" to the .5F inventory model those NIINs 
meeting the eight demands in four years business rule and 
"adding-back" those CASREP NIINs meeting the three demands in two 
years rule, the .5F+ inventory model, and a new inventory mix 
were created.  The new inventory mix is listed in Table V. 
The initial model (MODFLSIP) had required 12,045 NIINs at an 
overall cost of $6.16 million.  The ,5F model reduced the 
storeroom inventory by 3,595 NIINs and $2.24 million at the 
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TABLE V. ROBERTS .5F+ Storeroom Allowances (With Additions) 
CATEGORY QUANTITY ONBOARD DOLLAR VALUE 
. 5F alone 5,532 $  1,037,000 
Demand-Based 998 $    640,000 
CASREP-Based 74 $    344,000 
TOR 2,077 $  2,759,000 
AOI 841 $    124,000 
Total 9,522 $  4,903,000 
expense of readiness.  To return the ROBERTS to the same level of 
effectiveness and readiness, 998 demand-based NIINs and 74 CASREP 
based NIINs were "added-back" as SRIs creating the .5F+ model. 
This new model resulted in a net decrease of 2,523 NIINs and a 
net savings or cost avoidance of $1.26 million relative to the 
MODFLSIP model. 
The new storeroom inventory mix was then processed through 
FMSO's model simulation program using the last four quarters of 
data to verify that effectiveness had increased.  Those results, 
as shown in Table VI, compare the MODFLSIP inventory, the .5F 
model (without the demand data set additions) and the .5F+ 
model (with the new NUN additions.) 
By adding unique, ship-specific demand-based inventory 
items, the USS Roberts' Gross Effectiveness for the previous four 
quarters would have increased by 11.7 %, relative to MODFLSIP, 
while the investment in ROBERTS' SRIs would have decreased by 
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TABLE VI.  Model Effectiveness - 4 Qtrs, .5F+ Comparison 
MODEL DEMANDS ISSUES EFFECTIVENESS INV COST 
MODFLSIP 1,765 1,092 61.8 % $ 6.16 
.5F 1,765 725 41.1 % $ 3.92 
.5F+ 1,765 1,298 73.5 % $ 4.90 
$1.26 million.  Going beyond the boundaries of the original model 
and including customer demands, Gross Effectiveness increased by 
11.7% and the dollar value of the SRI inventory decreased 20.5%. 
Using Gross Effectiveness as a surrogate measure for the ROBERTS' 
contribution to fleet readiness, the .5F+ model increased fleet 
readiness for fewer dollars. Based on the Gross Effectiveness 
increase, ROBERTS's .5F+ storeroom inventory is more effective 
than either the .5F inventory or the MODFLSIP inventory. 
As discussed in Chapter II, the Production Possibilities 
Frontier curve (PPFc) graphically represents all possible 
combinations of output assuming fixed resources, efficient use of 
those resources and constant technology, i.e., the PPFc is the 
optimal mix of goods and services that could be produced from 
limited resources. Any point along the PPFc is a technically 
efficient utilization of those resources, assuming the resources 
are being used wisely with minimal waste.  Figure 7 modifies the 
scope of Chapter II's Technical and Allocative Efficiencies graph 
(Figure 2).  Figure 7 shows that ROBERTS .5F+ inventory is closer 






Parts  Mix 2 
.5 FLSEP + Inventory Efficiency 
OP M   = Operating Point, MODFLSIP OP F      = Operating Point, .5 FLSIP 
OPp    = Operating Point, .5 FLSIP PLUS       GEC 62 = Gross Effectiveness Curve 62 % 
GEC 6S = Gross Effectiveness Curve 65 %       GEC Y   = Gross Effectiveness Curve  y % 
AE62   = Allocative Efficiency                           AEy    = Allocative Efficiency 
BL.    = Budget Line $ 6.16 Million BL v    = Budget Line $ x Million  
Figure 7. .5 FLSIP PLUS Efficiency 
Services axis of Figure 2 have been replaced with different 
possible technically efficient storeroom mixes. Consumers' 
Utility curves (CUc) are represented by Gross Effectiveness 
curves (GEC). Budget Lines (BL) have replaced the PPFc for 
comparing the three inventory models, MODFLSIP, ,5F and .5F+. 
BL 6 is the technically efficient allocation of resources for 
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possible combinations of repair parts within the $6.16 million 
constraint imposed by MODFLSIP.  With BL6 there is a theoretical 
allocative efficiency (AE) point, AE y , which lies at the 
tangency of BL6 and a Gross Effectiveness curve, GECY.  In other 
words, given the right mix of inventory, there is an AE point for 
the $6.16 million investment.  MODFLSIP was devised to achieve 
that AE point.  Using the MODFLSIP mix, ROBERTS Operating Point 
(OPM) is actually located at the intersection of BL 6 and the 
experienced Gross Effectiveness Curve of 62 percent (GEC 62) . 
Because higher Gross Effectiveness percentages are possible with 
the same BL 6, ROBERTS OPM is not at allocative efficiency.  Based 
on this model, there is a theoretical AE 62 for GEC 62, at an 
unknown BL x. However, BL x is less than $6.16 million.  GEC 6S 
imposes an additional constraint.  Inventory models must also be 
evaluated on their contribution to material readiness as measured 
against the standard - 65 % Gross Effectiveness. 
From Table VI's data when the .5F model is used, a lower 
budget line is needed with a corresponding drop in Gross 
Effectiveness.  The .5F established a new, lower OP, OP P( with 
both lower BL and lower GEC.  Next, the .5F+ inventory model is 
processed.  Since Gross Effectiveness for .5F+ is greater than 
either MODFLSIP or ,5F, the new OP, OPP will be located to the 
right of OP M.  Because BL is also less than MODFLSIP, OP P will 
be located below BL6-  ROBERTS' .5F+ OPP is closer to AE than 
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MODFLSIP.  For ROBERTS the .5F+ model with its customer based 
inputs is closer to achieving allocative efficiency (AE) than the 
MODFLSIP inventory model. 
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IV. THE SALINAS VALLEY MEMORIAL HOSPITAL MODEL 
This chapter will discuss how a private sector, "not-for- 
profit," service organization, Salinas Valley Memorial Hospital 
(SVMH) satisfies the needs of its customers through an effective 
inventory management program.  The chapter will begin with a 
brief outline of the demographics of SVMH and its relationship to 
the community.  It will then discuss SVMH's inventory management 
policies and procedures.  The chapter will conclude with an 
analysis of SVMH's various measurements of efficiency relative to 
customer satisfaction. 
A.   BACKGROUND 
1.   Organizational Goals 
Built in 1953, SVMH is a medium sized, 220 bed, District 
Hospital located in a mid-size California city with a population 
of 130,000.  Like any other business, SVMH's first objective is 
financial survival.  Only after meeting all expenses can SVMH 
focus management efforts towards earning a profit. As previously 
discussed, profit measures a business's success in achieving the 
business's objectives.  Profit could be defined as financial 
return to investors or a sense of community or governmental 
service.  Profit is the reason the business is in business. 
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One direct measure that SVMH can use to gauge its overall 
success and effectiveness, i.e., its profit, is its ability to 
maintain District Hospital status.  Designation as a District 
Hospital enables SVMH to qualify for special tax status, allowing 
state discounts for bond rates and other funding advantages.  In 
return, SVMH must demonstrate that financial profits received are 
reinvested in both facilities and the community.  SVMH does this 
through competitive staff salaries (1200 full time employees and 
200 part time employees), facility upgrades, Wellness Centers and 
other community health care programs (SVMH, 1994). 
Additionally, SVMH maintains a fully staffed open heart 
center and three heart catheter labs (not normally found in 
hospitals of this size).  The hospital's operating guidelines 
stress continuous quality improvements, financial solvency and 
community partnership.  In support of its mission statement "to 
improve the health of the people in our District" (SVMH, 1994), 
SVMH focuses on community preventative medicine through its 
community-based walk-in clinics. 
2.   Customer Base 
SVMH directly competes with one local county supported 
hospital as well as several medium sized private and community 
supported hospitals within a 50-mile radius.  SVMH markets its 
services by advertizing both its medical services and facilities 
and its relationship to the community.  The hospital also uses 
88 
advertizing to promote goodwill and increase market share.  With 
the closure of Fort Ord and its hospital on the Monterey 
Peninsula, SVMH's customer base has expanded to include the 
retired military population. 
B.   SVMH'S INVENTORY MANAGEMENT PROGRAM 
1.   Consolidated Procurement and Inventory 
In 198 6 SVMH established the Materials Management Department 
(MMD) by consolidating several independent departmental 
purchasing and inventory management functions into a single 
centralized purchasing and inventory department.  In addition to 
reducing inventory levels through consolidation, SVMH reduced 
personnel in functional duplication of inventory and procurement, 
increased employee productivity and increased inventory 
availability. 
Prior to consolidation, each department was responsible for 
procuring, warehousing, inventorying and reordering its own 
supplies.  Besides the lack of coordination between departments, 
the inventory function was the responsibility of medical 
professionals who were not inventory specialists.  In some 
extreme cases the responsible department head was also the major 
procurement agent. All the other functional aspects of inventory 
management were likewise disjointed. After consolidation, the 
medical professionals were able to devote more time to their 
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primary health care duties within their departments.  MMD employs 
a smaller, dedicated support staff to perform the same inventory 
and procurement functions, relying on a staff of ten: two buyers, 
five warehousemen, a mail/courier clerk, a secretary and the 
director.  Similarly sized facilities normally require larger 
staffs to perform the same tasks. 
Consolidation also allowed MMD to provide a higher level of 
coordinated support through visibility and control of its medical 
inventory.  The newly created department has control over all 
facets of inventory, from establishing and maintaining inventory 
levels to procurement, receipt, warehousing and distribution. 
2.   Budget and Expenditures 
SVMH's entire budget for FY 1996 is approximately $105 
million in revenues and $100 million in expenses.  FY 1996's 
budget includes a seven percent reduction from FY 1995's budget. 
MMD's budget, based on historical projections, is 25 percent of 
total expenses or $25 million.  Of that amount, MMD budgets 
seventeen million dollars for direct inventory procurement - 
eight million dollars for demand-based consumable medical 
supplies and nine million dollars for non-stocked, direct 
turnover items to their customers. MMD replenishes its demand- 
based inventory on an "as-needed" basis while its direct turnover 
items are procured on a one-for-one requested basis. MMD also 
has a contingency fund of one million dollars for unplanned and 
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unanticipated procurements.  The remaining seven million dollars 
is divided among planned capital expenditures, service 
agreements, and salaries (Church, 1995). 
3. Departmental Scope 
MMD is the centralized purchasing agent for 72 of the 
hospital's 75 departments and divisions, procuring all. equipments 
and supplies used by those departments and divisions.  MMD also 
maintains a demand-based inventory warehouse for approximately 
1200 different line items.  To assist MMD in managing, tracking, 
locating and re-supplying their inventory warehouse, MMD uses a 
networked, PC-based software inventory program, the Enterprise 
Inventory Control System called NOVA. 
4. Inventory Warehousing and Accountability 
MMD does not manage any major corrective maintenance items 
nor any repairable items.  In part due to the hospital's west 
coast location, SVMH has ready accessibility to all major 
equipment suppliers.  Other than minor preventative maintenance 
and trouble shooting actions, all corrective maintenance is 
covered by an extensive equipment warranty system. 
a.   Wholesale and .Retail Inventory 
MMD's demand-based consumable inventory experiences an 
average once-a-month stock turn.  Some fast moving items, such as 
intravenous or IV solutions, may turn over twice a week.  To 
account for all the inventory, MMD maintains two levels of 
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inventory - a wholesale level located in the warehouse adjacent 
to the hospital and a second consumer retail level on the 
hospital ward or floor.  The ward or floor inventory acts as 
"ready-issue" inventory and the wholesale as "back-up." 
Approximately 15% of the inventory is located in the hospital as 
"ready-issue;" the balance is in the warehouse. 
jb.   Sales 
Once a stock item has been transferred to "ready-issue" 
it is then tracked as a "sale." To maintain inventory accuracy 
and ensure timely resupply and reorder, all "ready-issue" 
materials are inventoried daily (Church, 1995).  By comparing 
daily inventory records MMD can measure actual usage, validate 
demand, and prevent inadvertent shortages. Additionally, the 
inventory records provides MMD with indirect feedback information 
regarding changing demand patterns. 
c.   Issues 
Ready-issue resupply is not done by exchange cart 
system but rather through departmental requisitioning. A recent 
General Accounting Office (GAO) report on DOD's medical inventory 
system found that four of the eight military health care 
facilities used an exchange cart system.  Under this system, a 
warehouse cart is loaded with the most commonly needed supplies, 
taken to the hospital floor and "exchanged" for the floor cart. 
The floor cart is then returned to the warehouse and restocked 
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for future use.  In addition to the investment in carts, this 
system can also duplicate inventory requirements (GAO/NSIAD-92- 
58).  Instead, MMD offers its customers a catalog listing all the 
items stocked in its warehouse. 
d. Monitoring 
As customers order items, MMD tracks each "sale," 
developing departmental trends. After tracking orders for 
approximately ninety days, MMD creates a customized requisition 
order sheet for each department based on that department's 
historical demand.  MMD offers its customers the option of weekly 
or monthly requisition sheet updates.  Infrequently used items 
are annotated on the requisition sheet and tracked for possible 
inclusion at a later date.  Non-stocked items are requisitioned 
separately.  A monthly billing summary copy of all transactions 
and dollar totals expended is sent to each department.  The 
original is sent to SVMH's accounting department for posting and 
actual budget decrement.  Both SVMH and the cognizant department 
directors can monitor individual departmental spending patterns 
and performance objectives. 
e. Inventory Count and Reconciliation 
While ready-issue materials are inventoried daily, a 
wall-to-wall physical inventory of all inventory including 
warehouse stock is counted annually at the end of the fiscal 
year.  That count is then reconciled with the "book" inventory. 
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The variances between inventory losses and gains as a result of 
this reconciliation have been historically less than one to one 
and one-half percent per year. MMD also conducts periodic spot 
inventory counts, setting parameters such as high dollar value, 
high volume, high turnover rates or random location validations 
throughout the year. 
5. Non-participants in the MMD Concept 
However, MMD does not manage or monitor all of SVMH's 
inventory.  Three departments currently do not fully participate: 
Dietary (food service), Pharmacy, and Engineering (facilities and 
medical).  These departments warehouse, inventory, and manage 
their own supplies as well as retain some of their own purchasing 
authority.  As a result, MMD lacks visibility of those unique 
departmental line items, their inventory location, their usage 
rate, and their on-hand inventory (Church, 1995). 
6. Value of Total Inventory Management Consolidation 
Would consolidating those three remaining departments 
improve SVMH's overall efficiency? Research by the RAND 
Corporation shows that while some major companies are 
consolidated, such as Johnson & Johnson and Microsoft, they are 
successful because they are really many small, independent units. 
Some of the operations have consolidated; others have become 
"closely integrated." The key, according to RAND, is to have the 
corporate purchasing department (MMD for SVMH) negotiate the most 
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favorable contracts for all departments (Brauner, 1993).  SVMH's 
overall efficiency is reduced since its three non-aligned 
departments (Dietary, Pharmacy, and Engineering) are currently 
negotiating on the open market their own short range contracts 
for supplies and other related services without benefit of MMD's 
experience, contacts, or expertise. 
a.       Consolidating the Pharmacy Department 
Pharmacy could improve its efficiency by using a MMD 
negotiated "Prime Vendor" (PV) style contract.  "Prime Vendor" is 
a "stock less" inventory system where the vendor warehouses the 
inventory, delivering only a two to four days supply at a time. 
A recent GAO study for the period Sept 1990 through Sept 1991 
showed that dramatic reductions in inventory, and associated cost 
savings were possible through the "Prime Vendor" concept.  Army 
Health Services Command reported to GAO the results of their nine 
month test during 1991 of direct delivery of Intravenous (IV) 
solutions.  Stocked inventory levels of IV solutions decreased by 
75 percent, from $290,000 to $73,000 (GAO/NSIAD-92-58). 
DOD initiated the "Prime Vendor Program" (PVP) in 
January 1993 by dividing the nation into 22 regions.  Each region 
awarded two PV contracts - one for pharmaceuticals and one for 
medical supplies. As part of the Defense Personnel Support 
Center (DPSC) PV contract, all PVP suppliers must provide a 24 
hour delivery response time after receiving the order with a 95 
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percent effectiveness level (DPSC, 1993).  Using PVP, DOD has 
reduced pharmaceutical inventories at a typical Medical Treatment 
Facility from a two to four week supply located at the Pharmacy 
department and a three to six month supply at the warehouse 
(Capano, 1994) . 
For example, in 1993 the Naval Hospital at Twenty-Nine 
Palms, CA implemented a PVP contract for their Pharmacy 
department.  The hospital reduced their four week supply of 275 
pharmaceutical line items in the warehouse and their one week 
supply in the Pharmacy to a single week's supply in the Pharmacy. 
In addition to eliminating 100 percent of their pharmaceuticals 
from the warehouse, the hospital also reduced their overall 
pharmaceuticals by 80 percent (Gaither, 1995).   The Bureau of 
Medicine and Surgery's (BUMED) recent publication, "Customer 
Activity Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) Guide," illustrates 
a sample anticipated inventory reduction from a previous high 
limit of 60 cases to a PVP inventory of six cases, an overall 
potential inventory reduction of 84 to 90 percent (BUMED, 1993). 
The DOD's PVP goals for reducing inventories, labor, 
cost, and loss due to expired shelf life, and for deliveries in 
twenty-four hours or less have all been achieved (Capano, 1994). 
With MMD acting as the contracting agent for Pharmacy, a Prime 
Vendor type contract for pharmaceuticals could be established. 
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The Pharmacy Department should expect to experience similar 
reductions and savings as DOD. 
b.       Consolidating- the Remaining Departments 
The other two departments should also have MMD function 
as their corporate purchasing agent.  However, because their 
operations are sufficiently distinct from both MMD and each 
other, their inventory and warehousing functions should not be 
consolidated into MMD.  Those departments can use some of MMD's 
inventory software capabilities in establishing, tracking and 
monitoring departmental inventory as well as establishing their 
own Re-Order Points (ROPs) and reorder recommendations. 
Just-in-Time (JIT) inventory concepts could also reduce' 
costs for SVMH's Dietary department.  Likewise, Engineering 
activities would benefit from using MMD as contractor for their 
supplies and service agreements on equipment maintenance.  The 
visibility that NOVA provides for both inventory locations and 
usage rates could reduce inventory inefficiencies for these 
departments as well, inefficiencies caused by losses through 
misplacement and inappropriate reorder level settings. 
C.   INVENTORY MODEL 
1.   Range and Depth Considerations 
When MMD was first started, all pre-existing inventory was 
relocated to a single warehouse for management and distribution. 
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As both technology and customers' requirements changed over time, 
new items were added and old items discarded from the inventory. 
To remain competitive and satisfy customers expectations, 
innovative techniques had to be developed and implemented. 
For example, when deciding which new items should be carried 
as warehouse stock, careful evaluations were made of several 
diverse and competing factors - factors such as size, weight, 
cube, minimum order quantities, expected demand and availability 
of stock to name a few.  However, the most important element is 
satisfying the customers' requirements.  MMD initiated an open 
dialogue policy which encourages all internal customers to meet 
with MMD, suggesting which items MMD should stock to best satisfy 
the customers' individual requirements.  If a customer specifies 
a particular brand name or product type, then that customer must 
take "ownership" of that item, that is, the customer assumes 
responsibility for providing MMD justification why only that 
brand name or product type will satisfy the customer's 
requirements.  Additionally, the "owner" provides MMD with 
projected demand rates for establishing stocking levels. 
One of MMD's roles in this dialogue process is to offer to 
the customer substitute or alternative inventory possibilities 
and their associated cost benefits.  The customers provide 
informed input to MMD regarding their choices of items that best 
meets their needs.  Since there is no previous demand history for 
these new items, the customer must also estimate the anticipated 
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monthly usage rate.  That information, along with cost per unit, 
minimum order requirements, and physical size determine the 
initial order quantity. 
2.   Enterprise Inventory Control System - NOVA 
a.   Order Recommendations 
Once the decision has been made to stock a new demand- 
based item, all relevant data is entered into MMD's inventory 
management program, NOVA.  NOVA assists MMD in its inventory 
management decisions by providing current, real-time data. All 
procurements, receipts, issues, and inventory counts are also 
entered into NOVA's on-line, inventory program.  Using a 
continuous transaction review process, NOVA establishes Reorder 
Points (ROPs) based on previous receipts and issues, making 
inventory ordering recommendations. 
MMD uses the type of periodic review system known as 
the T,R,M or the T,R,RO System.  Under this system, inventory 
levels are reviewed at specified periods of time (T).  If an 
item's inventory level is below its reorder point (R), then the 
item is reordered to its maximum level (M) or its requisitioning 
objective (RO).  If the inventory level at time of review is 
greater than the reorder point, no reorder is recommended (NAVSUP 
Publication 553). MMD may override the reorder recommendation or 
modify the quantity recommended based on vendor minimum order 
quantities or vendor minimum price per order restrictions.  For 
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new items, NOVA requires a minimum of ninety days historical 
demand data before establishing either initial ROPs or stocking 
levels. During that interim period, the customer's input helps 
to determine the initial ROP. The initial ROP incorporates the 
lead time of previous orders for similar items from the same or 
similar vendors. NOVA's recommendation for an order or reorder 
quantity incorporates demand during lead time, the expected 
quantity needed for issue while awaiting receipt of the order. 
NOVA generates an electronic reorder using MMD inputted 
vendor sources and their negotiated prices.  Since all orders are 
electronic, the average order confirmation time from data input 
to order acknowledgment is sixty minutes or less.  For reordering 
purposes, administrative lead time is considered negligible 
(Church, 1995). 
b.       Price Variability Redactions 
Price variability has been reduced for SVMH because MMD 
uses negotiated, stabilized (firm, fixed) prices.  Prices are 
guaranteed from a period of twelve months to thirty-six months. 
MMD also uses National Buying Agreements for price comparisons. 
With MMD using multiple vendors, they can take advantage of 
buyers' leverage.  If there are major changes in prices, MMD has 
the option of renegotiating the agreement to take advantage of 
any economic adjustments. Because of sales volume, MMD has 
successfully negotiated away freight charges. 
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MMD does not use the "Prime Vendor" concept for their 
demand-based warehoused consumable inventory items.  Unlike 
Pharmacy, inventory shelf life expiration is not a critical 
factor for MMD's warehousing consideration.  This allows MMD's 
director to deal directly with several competing suppliers.  He 
feels that a "Prime Vendor" contract would make his organization 
too dependent on a single vendor, which reduces customer service. 
The improved customer service derived from competition among 
several vendors offsets slight increases in inventory cost.  When 
deciding which vendor should receive a contract, key factors are 
the vendor's responsiveness to meeting SVMH's needs and the 
vendor's customer service (Church, 1995). 
c.  Re-ordering Process 
While MMD maintains override capability for model 
quantity reorder recommendations, they usually reorder the 
quantities NOVA recommends.  SVMH's typical quantity overrides 
include the Christmas - New Years and Cinco de Mayo holiday 
periods.  NOVA does not include any holding costs or warehouse 
costs in its ROP calculations or its quantity reorders.  As part 
of the reorder recommendations, NOVA displays as many as three 
possible vendors and the prices for each item.  Once the reorder 
has been queued and accepted by MMD, it is then transmitted to 
the vendor or vendors via modem through Electronic Data 
Interchange (EDI). 
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d.   Additional Variability Reductions 
To further minimize cost, MMD focuses on reducing 
variability.  Reducing the variability or the uncertainty of an 
environment increases the productivity and cost savings 
potential.  For example, inventory helps "cover" the uncertainty 
of unanticipated demands.  If the demand was known exactly, then 
the inventory level would be set to meet that demand plus the 
time waiting for resupply.  No buffer or safety stock would be 
required.  Reducing variability in other situations would further 
increase productivity and reduce cost. 
(1) Requisitioning via Electronic Media.  By 
using EDI as an automated ordering system, MMD reduces 
variability for manifested supplies.  Typically, in less than an 
hour, MMD confirms their order and learns which items are being 
shipped and which are back ordered.  The MMD buyer can delete the 
back ordered items from the original vendor and reordering them 
from a different vendor using the same reorder que. 
(2) Scheduling and Workload Planning. MMD 
further reduces variability by scheduling receipt of all freight 
deliveries for selected days of the week. MMD also schedules 
customer deliveries for warehouse issues.  Emergencies are 
handled on an "as required" basis.  By scheduling both supplier 
deliveries and customer issues MMD can efficiently plan and 
manage personnel resources and balance employee workloads. 
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(3)  Standardization.  One outcome of MMD's 
coordination with customers regarding inventory selection and 
retention is MMD's ability to standardize inventory. 
Standardization helps consolidate similar or like items, reducing 
the number of line items stocked.  It also reduces overall 
inventory since safety levels can be "shared" by similarly 
demanded items. 
By having visibility of materials being used by 
other departments, MMD can offer those same items as substitutes 
for brand name items.  Unless there is a clear, distinctive 
clinical advantage for only using a specific item or brand, 
product evaluation has already been accomplished by other users. 
e.   Receipt Fill-Rate 
SVMH consistently receives a 98 - 99% fill rate from 
their main vendor, and next day, twice-a-week delivery service. 
When the shipment arrives, MMD has already made storage location 
assignments, using its electronically transmitted confirmation of 
the manifest. All of SVMH's major suppliers are located in 
either San Jose or San Francisco.  The normal transportation lead 
time for any order is next-day delivery.  If a critically 
required item is not available locally and cannot be delivered 
within twenty-four hours, the vendor locates the item and 
arranges for Federal Express shipment (Church, 1995). 
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f.       Management Reports 
The NOVA inventory program provides a variety of 
management reports, including obsolete inventory reports {no 
demand in three months / six months).  For example, using the 
obsolete inventory report, MMD periodically reviews why demand 
has declined with the primary user or "owner." Together, MMD and 
the "owner" determine whether the item should continue to be 
stocked or its inventory level adjusted.  If the item is no 
longer required and its shelf life has not expired, MMD can 
usually return the slow-moving merchandise directly to the vendor 
for full credit, minimizing obsolescence and disposal costs. 
NOVA also produces trend analysis reports to further evaluate 
stocking positions and inventory levels. 
D.   SVMH'S MEASUREMENTS OF EFFICIENCY 
DOD uses Gross, Net, and COSAL Effectiveness percentages to 
approximate the .5F+ model's level of customer satisfaction. 
SVMH, on the other hand, has no precise mathematical formula to 
directly measure the satisfaction of its internal and external 
customers.  SVMH could use exit survey forms and aftercare 
surveys to measure their external customers' satisfaction.  This 
data, coupled with a corresponding increase or decrease in 
hospital admissions could indicate a level of customer 
satisfaction. 
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SVMH could indirectly measure MMD's ability to satisfy MMD's 
internal customers by evaluating feedback received from the 
various departmental directors.  MMD can likewise measure its own 
performance through similar customer satisfaction surveys.  Since 
MMD is budget constrained, MMD's level of customer service or 
satisfaction could be based solely on achieving budgeted 
performance goals or contributing to organizational solvency. As 
a not-for-profit service organization, the tendency is for 
management to focus on the organization's ability to contain 
costs and meet established budget goals as the primary method of 
evaluating the organization's overall performance (Digman, 1995). 
However, SVMH's focus is stated in their Mission Statement 
and Operating Guidelines: maximizing the quality of health care 
service provided to the people of Salinas.  Therefore, SVMH uses 
measurements which link the performance of MMD to levels of 
customer service provided rather than cost cutting.  In addition 
to feedback from their customers, there are three quantitative 
indicators that SVMH can use to evaluate MMD's customer 
satisfaction.  Those indicators are: (1) Inventory Stockpiling by 
customers, (2) Vendor resupply fill-rate and (3) Stock turn. 
1.   Inventory Stockpiling. 
Whenever customers lack confidence in their supplier's 
ability to fill their requirements in a timely fashion, customers 
seek alternative methods to insure that their needs are met.  One 
105 
form of insurance is "stockpiling," ordering and storing 
inventory in excess of anticipated normal usage.  Not only does 
"stockpiling" increase inventory costs, it also masks poor 
management practices.  Through "stockpiling," customers create 
their own mini-storage locations.  Inventory is reordered by the 
customer to resupply these mini-storage locations based on the 
customer's available funds rather than meeting the customer's 
actual demands. 
In a typical example, the customer loses confidence in the 
resupply system and begins to build a insurance "stockpile." The 
initial quantities that the customer orders would be based on 
available funding and not necessarily be related to the 
customer's current usage patterns.  Under a demand-based system, 
the inventory manager would record the higher demand patterns and 
increase the stocking levels to support that higher demand.  With 
a limited budget, the inventory manager would not order slower 
moving inventory to support this higher level of "false demand." 
When the customer believed that the level of "insurance" 
stockpile was sufficiently large, the orders would cease. . As the 
customer began to use the "stockpile," reorders may or may not be 
submitted.  The customer could decide to "stockpile" a different 
commodity and stop reordering the first item.  The inventory 
manager would now detect zero demand and could either allow the 
on-hand inventory level to drop based on low experienced demand 
patterns or delete that product line altogether.  When the 
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customer finally resubmitted reorders, there would not be 
sufficient inventory to support the request, directly 
contributing to stock outs and further eroding the customer's 
confidence in the resupply system. 
During a recent external audit of SVMH, little evidence was 
found of any hidden, "stockpiled" inventory.  This lack of 
stockpiling indicates that both employees and supervisors have a 
high degree of confidence in MMD's ability to provide them with 
their requirements when needed (Church, 1995).  Customers do not 
feel the need to maintain their own "insurance" inventory.  This 
indicates that MMD is satisfying the majority of their internal 
customers' consumable medical supply requirements.  Whenever MMD 
can satisfy the demands of their internal customers (the hospital 
staff), SVMH can better meet its mission objective, improving the 
health demands of its external customers (the patients). 
2.   Vendor Resupply Fill-Rate. 
The second indicator of MMD's customer satisfaction is MMD's 
inventory resupply fill-rate.  Normally, a stock resupply fill- 
rate indicates how well a vendor is meeting its customers 
demands.  In SVMH's case, MMD is both the vendor's customer and 
hospital's supplier.  Since MMD's inventory stocking policy is 
entirely driven by customers' interaction and demands, MMD's 
customer satisfaction levels can be measured by MMD's ability to 
resupply these internal customers. 
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As stated earlier, MMD receives a vendor resupply fill-rate 
of 98 - 99%.  Because of the variety of features built into the 
NOVA program and MMD's aggressive utilization of those features, 
MMD can offer that same fill rate directly to its customers.  By 
receiving a high fill-rate from its suppliers, MMD is able to 
invest fewer dollars in its inventory of fast movers and invest 
more dollars in its inventory of slow moving critical items as 
well as bulky, high transportation cost items.  The high vendor 
stock resupply rate that MMD receives provides a greater 
flexibility in determining MMD's optimal inventory mix. 
3.   Stock Turn. 
A third indicator of MMD's level of customer satisfaction is 
their average monthly inventory stock turn.  Although MMD does 
not have a formal issue-to-demand formula, such as the COSAI/s 
Net and Gross Effectiveness measurements, MMD can approximate 
those measurement through stock turn.  Stock turn ratios can 
approximate more formal, in-depth customer satisfaction 
measurements. 
The primary purpose of any inventory mix is to satisfy 
customers' demands.  Inventory can also be used as an insurance 
policy to satisfy demands while waiting for receipt of stock, act 
as a buffer to offset unexpected events such as weather, strikes, 
and other delays in shipment, and reduce procurement costs 
through bulk purchases. 
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As customers' "buy" stocked items, MMD replenishes its 
inventory.  Fast moving items are replenished more often than 
slow moving items.  The ratio of total sales or issues to the 
dollar value of all inventory carried to is stock turn and is 
measured as "low stock turn" or "high stock turn."' Stock turn 
can be used to measure the efficiency of the entire inventory 
investment subject to budget constraints. MMD operates with a 
fixed annual budget of eight million dollars for inventory. 
a.   Low Stock Turn 
Low stock turn indicates that the customer is not 
"buying" the stocked inventory in amounts proportional to the 
inventory investment.  The inventory investment may be too large 
relative to customer demands.  The inventory mix may be wrong 
(MMD's inventory is not aligned with the customer's requirements 
resulting in "dead stock" - inventory that remains unsold and is 
eventually disposed) or the inventory mix does not meet the 
customer's current requirements in range or depth.  If MMD 
invests too much in items which the customer does not want and 
has insufficient funds remaining to invest in the items the 
customer does want (range and depth), stock turn may be low. 
A low stock turn can also result from reordering an 
insufficient quantity to meet customers' current demands (depth) 
or not reordering issued parts in a timely fashion.  If the right 
mix of parts are stocked, ordered in a sufficient quantity and on 
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time, then the customers' demands might not be met because of a 
low vendor fill rate.  If MMD consistently receives a low fill 
rate from its suppliers on selected critical items, MMD might 
invest more in those items as "insurance," requiring a larger 
safety stock for those items and have less funds available to 
satisfy other customer needs.  Therefore, a low stock turn rate 
can indicate either stocking the wrong inventory mix (wrong 
items, insufficient range, or depth) relative to customer demands 
or receiving a low vendor resupply fill-rate, and hence poor 
customer service.  However, for some situations a low stock turn 
rate may be ideal, particularly if the inventory mix includes 
many high-valued critical items with erratic demand patterns. 
b.       High Stock Turn 
High stock turn could indicate that the customer is 
"buying" the stocked inventory in amounts proportional to the 
inventory investment, i.e., the inventory appears to satisfy the 
customers' needs.  On the other hand, the inventory investment 
may be too small relative to customer demands, requiring constant 
re-ordering to satisfy customers.  High stock turn would be 
inefficient if the inventory ordering costs were greater than the 
inventory holding costs. An inventory mix that did not meet the 
customer's current requirements in range or depth could have a 
high stock turn if MMD invested in selected "fast movers" which 
the majority of customers needed.  The sales from the fast movers 
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relative to inventory levels would mask "dead stock".  If the 
right mix of parts are stocked, ordered in a sufficient quantity 
and on time, and the vendor is providing a high fill rate, then a 
high stock turn is more likely. 
c.   Results of MMD's Stock Turn 
While a few inventory items can make overall stock turn 
appear higher or lower, inventory budget constraints relative to 
stock turn allows overall stock turn to be used as a quasi- 
service indicator. MMD averages a complete inventory stock turn 
of all items once every month with fast movers turning more 
often.  Relative to MMD's budget, SVMH considers MMD's stock turn 
to be high. 
4.   Efficiency Measurement Conclusions 
Using MMD's three quantitative indicators, lack of inventory 
stockpiling, high vendor resupply fill rates and adequate stock 
turn, indicate that MMD is providing their customers with a high 
level of customer satisfaction.  Based on these measurements, 
coupled with positive feedback reports from customers, MMD's 
inventory management operations appear to be technically 




V. COMPARISONS BETWEEN DON AND SVMH 
This chapter will begin with a brief discussion of the 
different types of business organizations and the appropriate 
category for the Department of Defense (DOD), Department of the 
Navy (DON) and Salinas Valley Memorial Hospital (SVMH). Although 
the missions, goals and objectives for DON and SVMH are 
different, it is useful to compare their relative success in 
meeting those goals and objectives.  The chapter will compare DON 
and SVMH's relative efficiency in managing their inventory and 
setting inventory requirements. 
A.   FOR-PROFIT AND NOT-FOR-PROFIT (NFP) ORGANIZATIONS 
From a business perspective, organizations can be classified 
by their market sector (private or public), by their production 
output, and by their profit motivation.  Private sector 
organizations depend upon revenues generated from their limited 
customer base; financial support for public sector organizations, 
such as the federal, state, and local governments, depends on tax 
generated revenues.  While private sector organizations provide a 
variety of goods and services, public sector organizations 
usually provide services necessary for the safety, security, and 
welfare of the entire population. 
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All organizations engage in production - creating goods and 
services by transforming input resources (raw materials, cash, 
capital, labor) into output resources.  Production output may be 
a tangible product, such as manufactured goods, or it may 
intangible, such as transportation, education, customer service 
or a sense of national security.  Organizations which produce 
tangible goods are commonly referred to as manufacturers; 
producers of intangible products are usually referred to as 
service organizations (Heizer, 1993). 
Organizations are also classified based on their structure 
relative to profit motivation as either for-profit or not-for- 
profit (NFP).  How an organization structures itself towards 
achieving its "profit" may influence management decisions in all 
areas of strategic planning, including diagnostics, formulation, 
implementation and evaluation.  Structure also determines the 
metrics that the organization uses to measure its effectiveness 
in mission accomplishment as well as its overall efficiency. 
1.   Need to Study Not-For-Profit (NFP) Organizations 
While DON and SVMH differ in their market sector (public and 
private), both may be classified as NFP, service organizations. 
Understanding the similarities and differences between for- 
profits and NFPs will assist not only in comparing DON to SVMH, 
it will also illustrate methods and processes that NFPs can adopt 
from the for-profits. 
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The objective of any organization, whether public or 
private, manufacturer or service, for-profit or not-for-profit 
(NFP), is economic survival - meeting all expenses.  Only after 
all the organization's expenses have been satisfied, can the firm 
engage in "profit-seeking." As previously stated, "profit" is 
defined as the reason the firm is in existence, its purpose.  The 
most apparent distinction between for-profits and private NFPs is 
their tax status, as defined by the US Tax Code.  Lester Digman, 
in his book "Strategic Management: Concepts, Processes, 
Decisions," makes additional distinctions, including mission, 
economic constraints, and environmental differences.  Digman 
concludes that while there may be differences in strategic 
content between the for-profits and the NFPs, there are many 
similarities in their strategic processes.  Digman categorizes 
NFP organizations into four basic types: publicly funded (which 
includes government)/ institutions (including hospitals and 
schools); "third sector organizations" (such as research 
institutes); and "fourth sector organizations," publicly 
chartered for-profit firms such as AMTRAK (Digman, 1995). 
2.   General Characteristics of NFPs 
Based on Norman Waks studies for the MITRE Corporation, NFPs 
appear to primarily provide services, rather than produce goods. 
Most business that manufacture goods for sale are for-profit 
businesses.  Waks concludes that, as a group, NFPs tend to be 
115 
more "service oriented and people based, rather than product 
oriented and capital-equipment based" (Digman, 1995).  Some 
organizations, such as hospitals, can be either for-profit or 
NFP, and still be classified as a service organization. 
3.   Reasons for Operating as a NFP. 
Digman lists four reasons why a business would choose to 
operate as a NFP enterprise, rather than a for-profit enterprise. 
In Digman's context, profit refers to the distribution of income 
or personal financial gain to individual or individuals other 
than through salaries or bonuses.  Those reasons are: 
1. Cannot make profits.     By law or regulation, due to the 
nature of the services provided, these organizations must 
be NFP.  Examples of this type organization would include 
most publicly funded governmental agencies, such as DOD 
and DON. 
2. Should not make profits.     These organizations are allowed 
to make a profit but "are involved in activities here it 
is considered improper to do so." Examples of this 
organizational type would include most institutions such 
as hospitals and colleges. 
3. Should make but not retain profits.     These organizations 
try to earn as much profit as possible, not for 
retention, but for further distribution.  Examples of 
this type of organization would include most charitable 
institutions. 
4. Optional NFP.     These are organizations that can make and 
retain profits, but their management believes that they 
can best accomplish their mission by remaining NFP. 
Examples of this type of NFP would include many third 
sector organizations, such as research institutes and 
educational facilities. 
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4.   Differences Between For-Profits and NFPs 
a. Goals and Objectives 
The major difference between for-profits and NFPs is 
the firms' missions, goals, and objectives.  Unlike for-profits, 
NFPs fill gaps or voids in services which the for-profits are 
either unable or unwilling to profitably provide.  For example, 
the largest NFP organization, the federal government, provides 
national security.  In a for-profit firm, financial profit is a 
basic consideration for setting goals and objectives.  Firms 
usually evaluate programs based on their contribution to profit 
margin, potential market share and return-on-investment ratios. 
The primary goal of the NFP is non-economic.  Digman's 
studies show that NFPs focus on "improving the quality and 
coverage of their service,...containing costs within budget, and 
increasing their budget" (Digman, 1995).  The goals and 
objectives of most public NFP organizations have either been 
established by mandate or by groups external to the organization, 
with little or no input from the members of the organization. 
b. Managerial Control 
For-profit firms tend to be organized along structures 
which are the most conducive to achieving and maintaining their 
competitive advantage.  Their internal policies and controls are 
both self-imposed and self-administered. 
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For most public NFP firms, their organizational 
structure, hiring and firing practices, and many of their 
operating policies and procedures may be dictated from outside 
the organization itself.  The influence of these outside 
stakeholders (those individuals outside the organization who 
maintain an interest or control the organization's operations) in 
all phases of management and decision making is much greater in 
these NFPs than the for-profits.  Public NFP stakeholders include 
taxpayers, Congress, interest groups, unions, other governments, 
etc.  Non governmental NFP stakeholders include users (patients, 
clients, customers), board of directors, unions, contributors, 
other NFPs,  etc.  "The key to success (for NFPs) is the 
satisfaction of key stakeholders" (Bryson, 1988).  To be 
successful, for-profits must also pay careful attention to the 
customers needs and demands. 
c.       Measurements of Success 
In a for-profit organization the market's economic laws 
of supply and demand communicate the customers' desires.  The 
for-profit organization measures success in correctly and 
expeditiously satisfying the customers' needs and expectations 
through sales, market share, and profit data.  For-profits have a 
variety of financial performance measures to capture the 
relationship between input and successful production output. 
For-profits measure such information as income-to-revenue (sales) 
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ratios, return-on-investment ratio, sales-volume variances, etc. 
In NFPs such as DOD no such direct correlation exists. 
If a for-profit organization is not responsive to 
changes in the marketplace, that information is quickly and 
directly communicated to the firm by a drop in sales.  In 
response to those market changes, the successful firm adjusts its 
strategic and tactical management decisions.  These adjustments 
could involve changes in product design, technological changes in 
production process, layout and location, etc.  To survive and 
make a profit, the firm must become more efficient, effective and 
responsive. 
Since most NFPs produce services, which are not 
typically bought and sold in a traditional competitive market, 
efficiency and effectiveness relative to financial input is often 
more difficult to assess.  For example, DOD's service output is 
an intangible sense of national security.  Relating DOD's output 
to its input or budget appropriations is interpretive at best. 
If the external NFP stakeholders perceive that the organization 
is not adequately meeting the needs of its customers, they can 
often directly influence or even override the organization's 
policies and procedures, reduce the organization's budget, or 
initiate other adjustments. 
Unlike for-profits, most NFPs have no "profit centers" 
but rather "cost centers." "Profit centers" can measure the 
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success of inputs to outputs as "profit" and reward their 
employees accordingly.  The focus of a "cost center" is budget 
and expenses.  Since savings and cost avoidance are easier to 
measure than improvements in service, there is a tendency to 
reward cost cutting and pay salaries independent of the results 
of input to output.  As a result of this weak reward system, NFP 
managers tend to be more "risk adverse," not wishing to 
jeopardize or antagonize their external stakeholders. 
5.   Relationship Between For-Profits and NFPs 
While for-profits and NFPs have different missions, goals 
and objectives, different motivations, different organizational 
and managerial structures, and different measurements of success, 
to remain successful and retain their competitive advantages, 
each must operate as efficiently as possible.  John Byrne of 
Business Week  magazine quotes John R. Garrison, president of the 
National Easter Seal Society, regarding the need to run NFPs more 
business-like: "But almost everyone now realizes that commitment 
isn't enough anymore.  You also have to have professionalism, or 
you're going to go out of business" (Byrne, 1990). 
In an environment where customer service and satisfaction is 
the essence of a successful organization, unless for-profits and 
NFPs meet their customers' needs and expectations by operating in 
an efficient, business-like fashion, they must suffer the 
consequences - loss of customer support.  For SVMH, loss of 
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support means SVMH will not survive; for DOD, loss of support 
means even greater influence, more direct control by outside 
stakeholders, or perhaps reduced investment in national defense. 
B.   DON'S AND SVMH'S MISSIONS AND OBJECTIVES 
1. DON'S Mission and Objectives. 
DOD's mission might be simply stated as maximizing DOD's 
readiness to counter any threat to national security within its 
budget constraints.  As part of DOD, DON would share that 
mission, contributing the "Navy's portion" of readiness to 
national security.  To accomplish this goal, DON should develop 
business-like logistic support strategies which meet their 
customers' demands as efficiently as practicable within existing 
budget constraints.  Over time, DON should continuously improve 
the manner in which they meet those demands. 
2. SVMH's Mission and Objectives. 
Like DON, SVMH is also a NFP, a service organization whose 
mission is to "improve the health of the people in our District" 
(SVMH, 1994).  To be successful, SVMH must provide and "maintain 
quality standards of patient care" while "monitor(ing) a process 
of continuous quality improvement" (SVMH, 1994).  To accomplish 
their goal, SVMH must first ensure that their operating costs do 
not exceed revenues, i.e., SVMH must make sufficient monetary 
profit to achieve financial stability. After ensuring financial 
121 
stability, non-governmental NFPs can accomplish their mission. 
SVMH must meet its customers' demands as efficiently as 
practicable, within their budget constraints. 
3.  Mission Similarities 
DON and SVMH are NFPs with a similar mission: provide 
quality service to their stakeholders.  Both are NFP service 
organizations whose basic considerations are not driven by 
financial profit but by providing that quality service. Although 
they have quite different goals, efficient inventory management 
is critical to the success of both organizations in terms of 
satisfying their missions. 
C.   DON AND SVMH INVENTORY MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS 
For DON and SVMH to accomplish their missions, each must 
provide adequate levels of customer service to their own internal 
customers.  Internal customers must have the necessary tools, 
equipment, and supplies to productively contribute to the 
organization's overall mission.  A failed contribution by an 
internal customer can jeopardize the ultimate mission for the 
external customers (the American public for DON and the clients 
and patients for SVMH). 
To ensure that each internal customer has the tools, 
equipment, and supplies necessary, both DON and SVMH have created 
inventory management programs to satisfy internal demands; 
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specifically, to provide the right part at the right location at 
the right time in the right quantity for the lowest cost 
possible.  Both DON and SVMH inventory management programs are 
designed to satisfy the customers' demands.  Both use demand- 
based data and probabilities of stock-out to identify required 
inventory levels and safety levels - insurance spares or backups. 
DON's inventory management program for shipboard use is the Point 
Five FLSIP Plus (.5F+) model; SVMH's is the Material Management 
Department or MMD. 
1.   Comparing Inventory Types Stocked. 
To satisfy customer demands, both DON and SVMH maintain 
multi-echelon levels of inventory.  For DON, wholesale inventory 
is maintained throughout the world at various depots, Fleet 
Industrial Supply Centers (FISCs), etc.; for SVMH, wholesale 
inventory is maintained at its warehouse.  Both maintain consumer 
level inventories, onboard ships for DON and in the floor or 
wards' ready issue storage locations for SVMH.  With the 
exception of a few, minor preventative maintenance items, SVMH 
only stocks consumable items; DON stocks both repairable and 
consumable items. 
Is there a critical distinction between repairable and 
consumable items in terms of mission accomplishment?  The purpose 
of inventory is to provide the internal customer with the items 
necessary to complete the task at hand.  For DON, that task may 
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be corrective maintenance on a weapons system, for SVMH, it may 
be providing a saline solution for a patient under going open 
heart surgery.  The procurement, storage, packaging and inventory 
requirements for consumables and repairable items are different. 
Managing repairables involves relatively more complicated 
mathematical models for determining inventory levels and greater 
infrastructure support for the repair process.  However, the 
purpose for inventory, whether all consumable, all repairable or 
a combination of both, remains the same: satisfying the needs of 
the customer in a timely fashion within budgetary restrictions. 
Differences in the types of inventory that each organization 
manages (repairables and consumables for DOD; consumables only 
for SVMH) and the level of complexity in the management of those 
inventories are not critical differences for this thesis. 
2.   Comparing Inventory Selection Criteria 
Both DON and SVMH have well developed inventory management 
and logistics programs.  The major point of departure between DON 
and SVMH is their method of selecting inventory items to stock on 
board the ships for DON and to warehouse for SVMH.  Of particular 
interest is their different approaches to integrating actual 
customer demand data. 
a.   SVMH's Selection Criteria and Results 
SVMH is evaluated by its ability to provide quality 
health care for its patients and improve the overall health of 
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the community.  When a new item of inventory is required to meet 
that need, MMD consults directly with the customer to determine 
the extent to which pre-existing inventory will meet that need. 
If necessary, the new item is procured and warehoused.  Inventory 
levels and demand patterns are constantly monitored.  If the 
inventory requirement increases, inventory levels are adjusted 
accordingly.  If MMD detects changes in the frequency or quantity 
of demand, MMD again consults the customer to determine future 
stocking levels.  Inventory which is no longer required is 
identified as early as possible and exchanged for inventory which 
is required, reducing obsolescence and disposal costs. 
MMD continually monitors and reviews customer demands, 
enabling them to rapidly respond to their customers' changing 
requirements.  Because MMD keeps in close communication with 
their internal customers, SVMH can better satisfy their external 
customers. 
Jb.    DON's Selection Criteria.  - Point Five FLSIP Plus 
DOD's overall performance is evaluated in terms of its 
capability and readiness to meet and counter threats to national 
security.  Inventory and logistics support contribute 
significantly to DOD's performance. As new weapons systems 
develop, DON uses various mathematical models to predict spare 
parts usage rates. 
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Because of the time required to develop accurate, stable 
actual usage rates, customer demands are not fully utilized.  The 
resulting models are imprecise in predicting actual customer 
demands.  Inappropriate inventory levels were not typically 
corrected until the associated weapons system was modified or 
removed.  Before the Point Five FLSIP Plus (.5F+) model, actual 
fleet customer demands were only used peripherally for inventory 
selection.  The .5F+ is the first DON model to directly 
incorporate the fleet customers' actual demands into the 
inventory stocked onboard. 
c.       DON's Inventory Selection Criteria Results 
Although DON is implementing the .5F+ model with its 
more customer-oriented focus, time and budget constraints limit 
inventory modifications to every five to seven years, the normal 
time of the ILO cycle.  The inventory mix in the storerooms are 
changed from MODFLSIP to .5F+ during the ILO.  More frequent and 
smaller storeroom inventory changeovers would increase the 
individual ship's contribution to material readiness. 
There was one attempt to accelerate .5F+ implementation 
outside the normal ILO cycle during September - October 1995 
onboard the USS San Jacinto (CG 56).  This improved the 
timeliness for introducing customer demand-based input, but the 
budget for rapidly implementing the .5F+ had not been pre- 
programed.  Sufficient NAVSEA funding for the .5F+ "add backs" in 
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this mini-ILO was not available.  Funding for ILOs and any 
shipboard inventory exchanges is normally reserved (programed 
into DON's budget) several years in advance.  The financial 
"work-around" required did not fully resolve the funding issue. 
Additionally, some of the long lead time NIINs had not been 
requisitioned early enough to meet the new, compressed schedule. 
As a result, JACINTO received less than an optimal storeroom 
overhaul.  But the NIINs that JACINTO did receive will increase 
the ship's overall material readiness. 
3.   Prospects for DON's and SVMH's Inventory Management 
Programs 
a. Benefits of Customer Involvement In the Process 
DON has recently begun moving towards inventory models 
which place an increased emphasis on customer demand for 
establishing inventory stockage policies.  The differences 
between previous inventory models and .5F+ model demonstrate the 
benefits of directly incorporating the customer into the process. 
As DON begins to realize the need to incorporate customer input, 
more frequent .5F+ implementations similar to USS San Jacinto's 
should be undertaken.  SVMH, on the other hand, has been 
incorporating their customers into their inventory management 
process with demonstrated results. 
b. Results of Non-customer Involvement 
DON and SVMH are comparable in many regards.  Both 
organizations will benefit by operating as business-like as 
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possible.  For any NFP to continue to accomplish their mission in 
today's environment, they must also be efficient organizations. 
As service organizations, both DON and SVMH can learn from the 
November, 1995 bankruptcy of the Jamesway Corporation. 
Jamesway Corporation was a ninety store, regional 
discount retail sales chain located in the Northeast for the past 
thirty-four years.  Jamesway is currently liquidating everything 
from corporate office furniture to retail store fixtures.  The 
cause of Jamesway's demise can be blamed, in part, on loss of 
market share to Wal-Mart, K-Mart and specialty stores.  However, 
there were other, more critical problems: mediocre customer 
service and strategic errors, such as accumulating real estate 
holdings in retail outlets rather than investing, as did Wal- 
Mart, in inventory and distribution systems.  Jamesway suffered 
from a "seeming inability to reshuffle merchandise to better 
serve rapidly evolving customer preferences" (New York Times, 
1995).  Wal-Mart's inventory technology system allows management 
to determine what sales items are needed by which of over 2,000 
stores and then expedites delivery.  Jamesway, by contrast, was 
unable to determine customer preferences. 
While economic bankruptcy may not be a possibility for 
DON, "organizational bankruptcy" is a possibility.  If this 
occurs, GAO and other outside stakeholders might force efficiency 
and similar adjustments on DON's operation. 
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SVMH uses EDI and NOVA for their inventory and 
distribution system management to monitor and determine their 
customers' needs and avoid obsolescence.  Before the . 5F+ 
inventory model, DON's storeroom inventory did not adequately 
reflect their customer's needs. Unless DON continues to 
aggressively incorporate customers' needs and expectations into 
its inventory management system, DON, like Jamesway, will 
continue to be unresponsive to their customers' needs, provide 
mediocre customer service and accumulate excessive inventory that 
either remains "unsold" or is obsolete and valueless.  DON, like 
Jamesway, may also go "bankrupt." 
D.   COMPARING RESULTANT EFFICIENCIES 
1.   COSAL Effectiveness - A DOD Measurement for Efficiency 
DOD can directly measure the success or failure of achieving 
efficient outcomes by measuring the impact of inventory changes 
on readiness goals.  For the USS Roberts, the initial MODFLSIP 
produced an average Model Effectiveness rate of 61.8 percent over 
four quarters at a cost of $6.16 million.  When the threshold was 
changed to .5F (without the demand-based items added), the 
storeroom inventory cost was reduced to $3.92 million, a savings 
of $2.24 million. However, readiness declined to 41.1 percent. 
The .5F+ model added several demand-based items at a cost of $.98 
million. Model Effectiveness, a surrogate measurement of 
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readiness, increased to 73.5 percent.  Changing the product mix 
of the storeroom items to reflect customer demands generated a 
$1.26 million net savings and a 11.7 percent net increase in 
Model Effectiveness.  This is a measurable efficiency increase. 
2.   SVMH'S Measurements of Efficiency 
SVMH has no mathematically precise method to measure 
customer satisfaction.  However, MMD can indirectly measure its 
technical and allocative efficiency by measuring the level of 
customer satisfaction that it provides.  Technical efficiency is 
achieved by optimizing procurement of necessary goods and 
services within the limited budget constraints. Allocative 
efficiency is achieved when the customers demands are satisfied 
to the greatest extent possible with those same goods and 
services. As MMD increases its level of customer service, SVMH 
move closer to its allocative efficiency point.  To measure its 
level of customer service, MMD can use the following surrogate 
indicators:  Inventory Stockpiling, Vendor resupply fill-rates 
and Stock turn. 
a.   Inventory Stockpiling 
The absence of decentralized stockpiling indicates that 
MMD is satisfying their customers consumable medical supply 
requirements.  Since customers do not feel the need to maintain 
their own inventories, they must have sufficient confidence that 
MMD can provide them with their requirements in a timely fashion. 
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b. Vendor Re supply Fill-Rates 
Since MMD's inventory stocking policy is entirely 
driven by customers' demands, MMD's customer satisfaction level 
can be measured by MMD's ability to resupply their customers. 
MMD's resupply fill-rate is 98 - 99% from its vendors and 
suppliers, so MMD can offer comparable service directly to their 
customers. 
c. Stock Turn 
MMD's final indicator is their average stock turn. A 
low stock turn could indicate that MMD's inventory does not 
adequately reflect the customers' requirements.  The customer is 
not "buying" the inventory that MMD is stocking.  However, MMD 
averages once-a-month stock turn.  In conjunction with the other 
two surrogate indicators, this provides further evidence that MMD 
provides a high level of customer service. 
3.   Effectiveness Results Comparisons 
The demand-based systems that DON and SVMH use appear to 
work very well for each organization.  While both organizations 
employ different metrics to determine the relative rate of 
effectiveness, the measurements seem to confirm that demand 
driven inventory systems improve overall effectiveness for DON 
and maintain a high level of effectiveness for SVMH. 
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VI. TRADE OFF ANALYSIS 
Previous chapters have focused on the efficiencies and cost 
savings generated by both DON's Point Five FLSIP Plus (-5F+) 
COSAL inventory model and Salinas Valley Memorial Hospital's 
(SVMH) Material Management Department's (MMD) inventory 
management program.  Chapter V compared the efficiencies of both 
inventory management programs.  This chapter will discuss the 
trade-offs used to achieve those efficiencies, beginning with the 
need for trade-offs themselves, and then focusing on inventory 
trade-offs in the .5F+ model.  That latter discussion will center 
on trade-offs associated with developing and modifying inventory 
models, items selected for stocking, and the impact of changing 
inventory models on readiness.  Section C will discuss specific 
trade-offs in the .5F+ model involving inventory off-loaded and 
Section D will discuss the trade-offs in .5F+ model involving 
inventory afloat.  The final section will summarize some of these 
trade-offs and their impact on DON and SVMH, respectively. 
A.   NECESSITY OF TRADE OFFS 
1.   Scope of Trade-Off Analysis 
Since ships and hospitals have neither the funding nor the 
storage facilities to stock all required parts, trade-offs are 
necessary. As a general rule, trade-offs are economically 
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motivated, forcing a choice between two acceptable alternatives. 
Other trade-offs are politically driven.  For example, in 1988, 
the Navy's proposed long-range budget, the Fiscal 1990-94 Program 
Objective Memorandum or POM, traded-off maintenance dollars, 
spare parts procurement, and aircraft material readiness rates to 
complete the construction of the 600-ship fleet (Greely, 1988). 
In FY95, the Operations and Maintenance budget was increased by 
trading-off procurement dollars for maintenance dollars.  The 
FY96 budget will continue this trend, this time trading-off fleet 
modernization dollars for readiness and quality of life issues 
(Readiness, 1994).  This chapter will analyze the economic trade- 
offs associated with inventory management programs and inventory 
models. 
2.   Function of Inventory Management Programs 
Most inventory programs incorporate mathematical models to 
determine the storeroom inventory parts mix that maintains the 
highest degree of parts availability.  For DON, the goal of 
inventory is to maximize sustainability and readiness while 
minimizing cost; for SVMH, the goal is to maximize medical 
consumables availability and customer service while minimizing 
cost.  The inventory models must determine both the range and 
depth of inventory allowances.  The models' goals, for both DON 
and SVMH, are to balance costs and effectiveness, trading-off 
inventory costs for material availability.  However, any trade- 
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off must also consider limited resource availability, storage 
space constraints, budgetary restrictions, transportation costs, 
inventory costs and other factors which may affect material 
availability. 
B.   INVENTORY MODEL TRADE-OFFS 
As with any model, trade-offs must be used to best allocate 
finite resources.  This section analyzes of some of the trade- 
offs which must be resolved to implement the model.  Two of those 
trade-offs are: timeliness of implementing the new inventory mix, 
and the data source used in constructing the model.  Once a 
mathematical approach has been determined, the next trade-off 
concerns which items to include and which to exclude.  For the 
.5F+ model, that trade-off defines the candidate selection 
criteria.  However, reducing shipboard inventories can affect 
both readiness and the budget.  The .5F model trade-offs will be 
discussed and compared with the trade-offs of the .5F+ model. 
1.   Preliminary Trade-off Considerations 
a.   Costs of Implementation  vs Gains in Readiness 
To maximize the efficiency gained by changing the 
inventory model, the new inventory mix should be implemented as 
soon as possible.  To minimize the material movement costs, the 
inventory exchange (on-loading new and off- loading previous 
inventory items) should be scheduled well in advance.  For SVMH, 
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because of continually monitoring the inventory demand patterns, 
inventory exchange is a continual process.  For DON, inventory is 
exchanged during scheduled availability periods, such as an 
Integrated Logistics Overhaul (ILO).  Since ILOs are typically 
scheduled for an individual ship once every five to seven years, 
scheduling trades-off the costs of implementation against the 
potential gain in readiness and possible inventory savings. 
b.       Probabilistic vs Demand History - Data Accuracy 
Designing the model itself involves a trade-off during 
the model development.  The .5F+ model removed some of the slow- 
moving items from the ship by increasing the threshold value of 
repair parts.  To regain any loss of readiness, the model added- 
back repair parts identified by actual demand-based data. 
The .5F+ model utilizes requisitioning data submitted 
by the individual ships through the 3M system, relying upon 
accurate submission and accurate demand history data capture. 
The model is only as good as its reported and captured data.  The 
mathematical reliability of the MODFLSIP model's probabilistic 
methods (usage rate driven) was traded-off for potentially 
inaccurate demand data in the .5F+ model.  The .5F+ model's 
custom designed Allowance List trades-off a tailored inventory, 
based on demands from a group of similar customers, for a risk of 
potential error.  The risk of error results from inaccurate data 
submissions and the limited customer data base.  The data base 
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for the ROBERTS Allowance List was small (fifteen users) compared 
to the fleet-wide users data base used in the MODFLSIP. 
2. Initial Inventory Selection Criteria Trade-offs 
The USS Roberts had approximately 125,000 allowance 
candidates for Storeroom Items or SRIs. After implementing 
MODFLSIP's .0625 usage rate threshold, those candidates were 
reduced to 19,702 allowance items valued at $10,399,000.  Of that 
total 9,127 were SRIs valued at $3,279,000.  Using this MODFLSIP 
inventory as the baseline, a trade-off was made regarding which 
NIINs would be subject to the higher .5F threshold and which 
NIINs would not.  Not all MODFLSIP shipboard allowance items were 
candidates for reduction.  Only those NIINs designated as SRIs 
were considered candidates.  The inventory levels of all other 
items were established by methods other than MODFLSIP or demand, 
and were restricted from the .5F+ model.  Notable restricted 
NIINs include Readiness Based Sparing {BBS), Technical Over Rides 
(TORs), and Operating Space Items (OSIs). 
3. Trade-Off Results of Point Five FLSIP (.5F) 
The .5F inventory model raised the qualifying threshold from 
one failure in four years to one failure in two years.  This 
reduced the number of ROBERTS' SRI NIINs from 9,127 to 5,532 and 
reduced the SRI inventory from $3.28 million to $1.04 million. 
Since the purpose of the SRI inventory is to effect shipboard 
repairs, fewer NIINs should indicate fewer opportunities to have 
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the needed repair part onboard. Model Effectiveness percentages 
using data from the previous four quarters, as recorded by the 
Fleet Material Support Office (FMSO), showed that .5F inventory- 
model also lowered the ROBERTS effectiveness from 61.8 percent 
under MODFLSIP to 41.1 percent under .5F. 
Graphically, this cost vs readiness trade-off is shown in 
Figure 8.  Readiness is plotted along the horizontal axis 
beginning with zero percent (no weapons systems are operational) 
and increasing to 100 percent (all weapons systems are fully 
operational).  The cost of the SRI Inventory is plotted along the 
left vertical axis in millions of dollars, increasing in value as 
the points move upward.  The Storeroom Inventory Cost curve 
(SRICi) shows the relationship between SRI cost and Readiness. 
As more dollars are invested in SRIs, readiness increases. 
A second vertical axis has been added to the graph.  This 
axis represents the time weapons systems are "down" awaiting 
parts.  OPNAVINST 4441.12B has established the performance 
measurement of Average Customer Wait Time (ACWT) as the link 
between parts support and operational requirements (readiness). 
The ACWT goal of 125 hours for all high priority requisitions, 
which includes CASREPs, measures the average time to satisfy all 
customer demands from requisition submission through issue. ACWT 
measures the time required to issue a part - from the two hour 
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Figure 8.   Loss of Readiness with .5FLSD? 
average time of 87 days required to issue a part not in the 
system (OPNAVINST 4441.12B, 1989).  The Downtime curve (DTc) 
represents the relationship between time required to issue a part 
and readiness.  Increases or decreases in readiness are shown as 
movements along the DTc. 
As the FMSO model simulation demonstrated, changing from 
MODFLSIP to .5F decreased the investment in SRI inventory.  This 
is represented by movement down and to the left along the SRI 
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Inventory Cost Curve (SRICi) , from MODFLSIP SRI point (GEM) to 
.5F SRI point (GEP) .  The .5F trade-off negatively impacts 
readiness as shown by the lowered gross effectiveness moving from 
62 percent to 41 percent.  Similarly, as SRI inventory declines, 
the amount of Downtime increases, as measured by ACWT. As fewer 
parts are available to satisfy customer demands from shipboard 
issue, ACWT for those parts increases.  This is shown as a 
movement upward and to the left along DTc from DTM to DTF. As 
the model changes from MODFLSIP to .5F, the cost of SRI inventory 
declined, ACWT increased and readiness decreased. 
4.   Trade-Off Results Point Five FLSIP Plus (.5F+) 
From DOD's perspective, avoidable declines in readiness are 
unacceptable.  Customer service levels (material readiness) were 
traded-off for the inventory cost savings of the .5F model; the 
.5F+ model offset that loss.  By using a demand-based investment 
of $.98 million, Model Effectiveness (readiness) rose to 73.5 
percent.  Changing the product mix of the SRI increased readiness 
over MODFLSIP by 11.7 percent and a net savings or cost avoidance 
of $1.26 million. 
The "Plus" feature of the .5F+ model "added back" demand 
based NIINs to the storeroom as SRIs.  New business rules for 
"adding back" those NIINs were developed by trading-off budget 
dollars (storeroom inventories not to exceed $4.93 million) for 
demand frequency.  This reflected the criteria of eight demands 
4 
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in a four year period.  There were 8,769 potential NIINs 
available to ROBERTS in the demand based data file, valued at 
$5.15 million.  The selection criterion "added back"" 988 NIINs 
valued at $640,758.  The CASREP data set used a similar trade- 
off.  Of the 822 possible NIINs valued at $2.03 million, 74 NIINs 
valued at $344,000 were selected. 
Graphically, this trade-off of inventory cost vs readiness 
for the .5F+ model is shown in Figure 9.  Like Figure 8, 
readiness is represented as an increase or decrease in the 
percent of effectiveness. As in Figure 8, changes in readiness 
levels can be represented as movements along the DTc curve.  When 
the MODFLSIP SRI inventory was changed to the .5F SRI inventory, 
there was a downward movement along the SRI Inventory Cost Curve 
(SRICi) from the MODFLSIP SRI point (GEM) to .5F SRI point (GEP) . 
This same cost curve is shown in Figure 9. 
Changing from the .5F model to the .5F+ model, with its 
unique demand-based "add-backs", the entire SRI Inventory Cost 
curve shifts to the right.  SRICi is replaced by SRIC2, the SRI 
Inventory Cost Curve for .5F+ with a new inventory point (GEP) . 
This shift results from going beyond the original SRICi 
parameters by changing the inventory selection criterion in .5F+. 
The inventory investment for the .5F+ is greater than .5F, 
but one million dollars less than the MODFLSIP.  However, the 
effectiveness rate of the .5F+ inventory model, seventy-four 
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Figure 9.  Readiness Gains with .5 F+ 
percent, is greater than that of the more expensive MODFLSIP 
model, sixty-two percent.  Increased readiness levels resulted 
from "adding back" the higher demanded items, reducing ACWT, 
moving along DTc from DTF to DTP.  The .5F+ model successfully 
reduced inventory levels onboard ROBERTS and increased readiness 
by changing the trade-off. 
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Using Gross Effectiveness as a surrogate measurement of 
readiness, the .5F+ model is more technically efficient than 
MODFLSIP.  By achieving a higher level of readiness, GEP/ at a 
cost lower than GEM, ROBERTS improves allocative efficiency. 
C.   ASHORE TRADE-OFFS 
To maximize the cost savings differential between MODFLSIP 
and .5F+, the off-loaded, low demand NIINs must be re-utilized. 
This section will analyze two of the trade-offs associated with 
re-locating shipboard inventory ashore: the trade-off on safety 
stock levels and the trade-off on warehousing costs. 
Some of the Navy managed NIINs can be returned to the Navy 
supply system through the Fleet Industrial Supply Centers (FISCs) 
for credit.  FISCs will only give credit for NIINs which have a 
current demand history or pending back orders.  If the FISC does 
not immediately need the item, the Item Manager (IM) is 
contacted.  The IM ensures that all items under his/her control 
meet restocking objectives. In accordance with applicable 
policies and guidelines, the IM initiates both procurement and 
disposal actions for their items.  If neither the FISC nor the IM 
have any requirements for the items, then no credit will be given 
for the NUN.  Items not accepted by the FISC or IM for credit 
can either be disposed or distributed to the appropriate type 
commander for redistribution. In some cases, reuse items are used 
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as .5F+ "add-backs" for other ships.  Items marked for disposal 
have marginal salvage value. 
Some NIINs can be returned to the Defense Logistics Agency 
(DLA) depots for credit using a similar approach as the Navy. 
However, DLA requires a higher experienced demand rate than the 
Navy to retain an item. 
1.   Cost vs Safety Stock. 
Any item accepted by the FISC or DLA would either fill an 
outstanding requirement or be added to the safety stock level. 
Any outstanding contracts for the item could be canceled and the 
funds reprogrammed.  Safety stock levels are driven in part by 
the requirements determination process.  Safety stock either 
replenishes actual demands or anticipates future demand.  Future 
requirements can come from either forecasting models or 
contractor estimated failure rates. 
There is a direct relationship between inventory holding 
costs and the level of safety stock. As the level of inventory 
increases, holding costs increase.  However, increasing safety 
stock increases readiness by reducing the risk of stockouts. 
Parts accepted as safety stock by the FISC and DLA increase both 
holding costs and readiness. 
From 1980 through 1988, the Navy's inventory of parts (both 
surface ships and submarines) increased from $2.7 billion to $9.3 
billion.  GAO estimates that the Navy spends $24 million dollars 
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a year to warehouse 140,000 different line items that are no 
longer needed.  According to GAO, the Navy must revise its policy 
regarding acceptable stockout risks and mission essentiality. 
GAO's research concluded that the Navy's current policy 
authorizes a safety stock level for almost all inventory items 
(GAO/NSIAD-91-17 6). 
2.   Cost vs COSAL Spares Ashore (CSA) Stocking Points. 
When the .5F+ model was initially proposed, a COSAL Spares 
Ashore (CSA) warehouse was planned for FISC Norfolk, FISC San 
Diego and FISC Pearl Harbor.  The CSA warehouse was designed to 
store off-loaded items after implementing .5F+.  Items identified 
as non-centrally stocked DIA items would be considered for 
storage.  In essence a non-centrally stocked item is any DLA 
managed item whose demand rate is less than DLA's minimum 
stocking requirements. All other items would either be returned 
for credit, redistributed or disposed.  The goal of CSA is wto 
ensure system availability of low demand and insurance spares 
which would have been (carried onboard) ... where wholesale 
support is determined to be insufficient" (NAVICP-M, 1995). 
The Navy believes that holding costs would be less than the 
cost of re-procurement (i.e., all costs associated with 
replenishing inventory).  The NIINs off-loaded under the .5F+ 
model were originally procured to satisfy predicted future 
demands under the MODFLSIP sparing philosophy.  If the original 
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MTBF engineering or contractor estimates established during the 
provisioning phase were accurate, then those off-loaded NIINs 
would still be required.  Their frequency of demand just doesn't 
justify stocking them on board. 
A second argument for establishing CSA stocking points 
assumes that stock out costs are greater than the inventory 
holding costs.  Stock out costs include more than the item's 
replacement and logistics costs.  In the for-profit organization, 
stock out costs also include estimates of lost sales, lost 
profit, and lost customer goodwill.  For DOD, the replacement 
cost and logistic delay time are a small portion of the stock out 
cost.  When DOD loses its "profit," material readiness and 
national security decrease.  For-profits can use previous sales 
records to estimate lost sales and profit.  For DOD, there is no 
estimated dollar value for the national security cost of losing a 
major weapons system.  One final DOD argument for CSA warehouses 
is that corporate infrastructure can't always meet DOD's needs 
for low demand parts in a timely fashion. 
However, the GAO has consistently criticized DOD for 
maintaining intermediate, secondary inventories.  GAO believes 
that the cost of holding excess material includes more than 
storage costs.  GAO lists obsolescence, deterioration, lost 
opportunity cost of investment and a casual attitude regarding 
inventory safety and security as primary reasons for the high 
warehousing costs (GAO/HR-93-12). 
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The Navy maintains that degrading readiness to save holding 
cost is an unacceptable trade-off.  Figure 10 graphically 
illustrates the relationship between total inventory cost and the 
number of storage facilities or warehouses.  Both the GAO and DOD 
views of the relationship between warehousing costs, inventory 
costs, and readiness are represented using total cost. Under the 
total cost concept, the decision maker determines which cost 
elements are relevant to the decision (would be affected by the 
decision), such as increased value of service, and which are not. 
After costing out the relevant elements, the decision maker can 
identify the alternative which minimizes the expected sum (total) 
of all the relevant costs (Brown, 1995). 
In Figure 10, costs are plotted along the left vertical 
axis, and warehouse retention alternatives are plotted along the 
horizontal axis.  Costs associated with operating and maintaining 
warehouses are shown as the upward sloping curve WC. As the 
square footage of warehouse space increases, DOD's overall costs 
increase.  Increasing the square footage of warehouse space is a 
movement along WC. As warehouse square footage increases, there 
are more inventory locations to store off-loaded shipboard items. 
As more items are held in storage, i.e. not disposed, the cost of 
reprocuring those items decreases.  The change in repröcurement 
costs is shown as curve RPC.  The RPC curve slopes downward to 
the right.  Total cost TC is the sum of WC and RPC. 
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Figure 10.   Maintaining COSAL Spares Ashore Warehouses 
A readiness graph has been overlaid on the CSA Warehouse 
cost graph to illustrate the relationship between the inventory 
stored at warehouse locations and readiness.  Figures 8 and 9 
showed that readiness is a function of inventory costs as well as 
ACWT.  As such, readiness was the horizontal axis.  In Figure 10 
cost and readiness are shown as a function of warehouse space. 
The readiness axis has been shifted to the right vertical axis 
beginning with zero percent (no weapons systems are operational) 
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and increasing to 100 percent (all weapons systems are fully 
operational). 
In this example, readiness depends on the availability of 
inventory - inventory stored at shipboard locations and inventory 
stored at warehouse locations.  The readiness curve R illustrates 
that as the range and depth of NIINs off-loaded under the -5F+ 
model increase, i.e., are stored in CSA warehouse locations, more 
NIINs are available to satisfy predicted future readiness 
demands.  Readiness increases as more NIINs are retained than are 
disposed, assuming that the ACWT for reprocurement is greater 
than the average shipping time. As warehouse storage space 
increases, readiness increases as does the cost of achieving that 
readiness.  In this trade-off, GAO believes that any decline in 
readiness that DOD might experience as DOD moves from its desired 
warehouse space (W1) to GAO's total recommended warehouse space 
(W) is adequately compensated by the realized cost savings.  DOD 
believes that reducing readiness to save holding cost is 
unacceptable. 
D.   AFLOAT TRADE-OFFS 
Reducing shipboard inventory trades-off inventory costs and 
location.  Location can be defined as part availability and 
customer accessibility to inventory.  Items in a DOD managed 
warehouse ashore, whether a DLA, FISC or CSA warehouse, are more 
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visible to all DOD customers than if those same items were 
located in a ship's storeroom.  Using current technologies and 
policies, asset visibility and accessibility is not practical for 
afloat units. 
1.   Cost vs Inventory Location. 
MODFLSIP brought 9,127 SRI NIINs onboard, trading-off 
location ashore for higher inventory levels afloat.  The . 5F+ 
model also traded-off inventory for location by reducing the 
total number of SRI NIINs from 9,127 to 6,604.  Lowering afloat 
inventory levels was expected to increase the risk of non-support 
(risk of not having the right part at the right location). 
However, .5F+ utilized a Differentiated Distribution Strategy 
for inventory placement.  This strategy places fast- moving items 
closest to the customer and the slower-moving items at a few 
centralized stocking points (Ballou, 1992).  Placing the 
ship-type demand based items at the location closest to the 
customer - onboard ship, decreases overall risk of non-support. 
In addition to having the right part, readily available spare 
components are equivalent to "the case of an operating component 
and a parallel component in standby (i.e., standby redundancy)" 
Blanchard, 1992.  By investing in these customer-based demand 
item inventory levels, the trade-off gains in location justify 
the increase in inventory cost by increasing readiness and weapon 
system reliability. 
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2.   Cost vs Transportation. 
Every spare part located in an afloat storeroom is one less 
part that must be transported to that afloat location when that 
item is demanded.  Using MODFLSIP, Model Effectiveness was rated 
at 61.8 percent.  Stated differently, 61.8 percent of the time 
the right part was available to effect repairs.  Conversely, 38.2 
percent of the time the transportation system was required to 
deliver parts from stocking points ashore to fill those demands. 
In the normal trade-off relationship, high inventory levels 
(cost) reduce transportation costs; low inventory levels increase 
transportation costs.  Using the MODFLSIP Model Effectiveness 
percent as the baseline, decreasing inventory levels should 
increase transportation costs to achieve the same level of 
customer service. 
Transportation costs depend upon the customer's "urgency of 
need" for demanded parts and fall into two categories: 
a. Resupply through normal transportation channels 
b. Extraordinary measures to meet emergency demands. 
Transportation costs increase with the "urgency of need." For 
example, low "urgency of need" inventory stock items are 
resupplied through normal channels and have a correspondingly low 
priority.  These parts are shipped at the cheapest transportation 
cost, trading-off time (speed of delivery) for money (cost of 
delivery).  CASREP parts have the highest "urgency of need" and 
151 
require the fastest mode of transportation.  Therefore, they 
incur the highest transportation cost. 
Figure 11 graphically illustrates this relationship between 
the level of inventory and the cost of transportation for CASREP 
parts.  As ROBERTS' SRIs decreased from 9,127 NIINs under 
MODFLSIP to 5,532 SRI NIINs under .5F, there was downward 
movement along the SRI Inventory Cost Curve SRIC from ICM to ICF. 
With fewer parts onboard, the probability increases that some of 
the "missing" parts will be required to correct CASREPs.  There 
should be a corresponding increase in the cost of transporting 
those CASREP required parts to the ship.  This expected 
transportation cost increase is represented by an upward movement 
along the Cost of transporting CASREPs curve CASi from A for 
MODFLSIP to Ax for .5F. 
Likewise, when 1,072 SRI NIINs are "added-back" to create 
.5F+, CASREP transportation costs are expected to be reduced. 
The new CASREP transportation cost should be located at point Aa 
along curve CAS±.     However, the .5F+ selection process tailored 
inventory investment to the customer's previous demands. 
Seventy-four NIINs which had previously been required to satisfy 
CASREPs on similar ships were "added back" to ROBERTS' storeroom 
inventory.  The resulting effect is a downward curve shift of the 
CASx curve to CAS2 and a new lower transportation cost, B. 
Extraordinary transportation costs were no longer necessary to 
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Figure 11.   CASREP Transportation Savings from .5F+ 
move these parts to the ROBERTS.  While the actual transportation 
cost of B along the CAS2 curve may be greater than or less than 
A, it is less than the expected transportation cost of Aa on the 
CASx curve.  This difference, delta x, represents the cost 
savings in CASREP transportation.  The lower transportation costs 
shifts the Total Cost Curve TCj. downward and to the left, to TC2. 
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E.   SUMMARY OF TRADE-OFF ANALYSIS 
Because all organizations face finite budget resources, 
trade-offs regarding business decisions must be made.  For DON, 
implementation of the .5F+ model required several trade-offs. 
Instead of relying entirely on probabilistic and forecasted 
demand data, the .5F+ traded-off mathematical certainty for 
potentially inaccurate ship-type specific demand data.  By 
restricting the range of candidates, the .5F+ model traded-off 
potential savings for stakeholders' input.  Furthermore, the 
trade-off between readiness and cost avoidance implied by the 
transistion from MODFLSIP to the .5F model was improved by the 
.5F+ model. 
Based on system requirements, transferring slow-moving 
inventory ashore also involves trade-offs.  The more common ones 
are: holding costs for safety stock levels vs cost of stock out, 
and warehousing costs of additional storage facilities vs 
reductions in readiness.  From the afloat perspective, the new 
.5F+ inventory traded-off the net cost of new inventory mix 
(offset by credit for material turned in to the' FISCs) for 
onboard location, and traded-off .5F+ inventory for CASREP 
transportation costs. 
Although data is not available for SVMH, similar trade-offs 
are also part of MMD's inventory management program.  For 
example, by not implementing a Prime Vendor contract, MMD has 
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traded-off potential reductions in warehouse inventory and 
operating expenses associated with a Prime Vendor contract for 
heightened vendor responsiveness, increased contract award 
flexibility, and internal customer service. 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS / RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis compared the Navy's latest COSAL inventory- 
model, the Point Five FLSIP Plus (.5F+) model, with the inventory 
management program of a not-for-profit, service organization, 
Salinas Valley Memorial Hospital (SVMH). Measuring, analyzing, 
and comparing the efficiencies of each organization indicates the 
reasons for their relative successes in optimizing their budget 
dollars.  This chapter will exam some of the limitations in 
measuring and barriers to achieving those efficiencies.  The 
chapter will also make recommendations for improving both 
efficiency and the level of customer service, concluding with 
suggestions for further research. 
A.   DIFFICULTIES OF MEASURING ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY 
One of management's first steps in determining the 
efficiency of its organization is to locate its operating point 
(OP) relative to its Production Possibilities Frontier (PPF). 
Once the organization's OP has been determined, then the distance 
and direction from OP to allocative efficiency (AE) can be 
plotted.  Strategic plans and policies can then be devised and 
implemented to move that organization closer to its AE.  To 
determine an organization's OP requires accurate measurement 
tools and proper utilization. . 
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1.   Limitations of SVMH's Measurement Tools 
For SVMH to measure its technical or allocative efficiency, 
it must locate its OP relative to its PPF.  One major limitation 
for SVMH is its measurement tools are only indicators and can 
only indirectly determine the actual level of customer service 
that its Material Management Department (MMD) provides.  As 
imprecise as those measurements may be, they provide the best 
available approximation of SVMH's OP.  Lack of inventory 
stockpiling, high vendor resupply fill rates and large stock turn 
ratios together indicate that SVMH's OP is relatively close to 
its allocative efficiency point. 
2.   Limitations of DON'S Measurement Tools 
To a great extent, DON reports gross effectiveness 
percentages when measuring readiness.  As part of its readiness 
report to the JCS, DON records readiness by the number of ships 
CASREP-free and the number of aircraft mission-capable.  The 
greater the number of available, mission-capable platforms, the 
greater the DON's contribution to national security. As fleet 
readiness percentages increase relative to the limited budget 
constraints, DON moves towards its allocative efficiency point. 
a.   Isolated Effectiveness Percentages 
Effectiveness percentages that are isolated from total 
military capabilities have a disadvantage.  Effectiveness 
percentages are based on quantitative issues from stock, so data 
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can be manipulated for higher effectiveness percentages.  For 
example, a customer may need a dozen transistors.  The warehouse 
makes a single issue, using "box" as the unit of issue.  In terms 
of gross effectiveness, this transaction is recorded as a single 
issue filled against a single demand.  Those same transistors 
might also be issued using "each" as the unit of issue.  In this 
case the warehouse would record twelve issues filled against 
twelve demands.  Since gross effectiveness measures the ratio of 
total issues to total demands, the warehouse has filled eleven 
additional issues, "satisfying" eleven additional demands.  The 
more issues from stock in response to demands increases gross 
effectiveness percentages.  Other system gaming techniques such 
as requiring aircraft to fly only once a month to be counted as 
operational or weighting the operational capability of deployed 
units more heavily than that of non-deployed units distorts the 
total readiness capabilities for national security purposes. 
b.       Definition of Readiness 
Using contributions to readiness to measure efficiency 
requires a precise definition of readiness.  However, DOD tends 
to limit readiness reporting to personnel, equipment and training 
deficiencies while GAO believes that readiness reports should 
incorporate jointness and forecasts of downstream changes to 
readiness (GAO/NSIAD-95-29).  This difference in definition 
influences both GAO's and DOD's perceptions of DOD's efficiency. 
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3.   Reports of Efficiency 
Both SVMH and DOD gather and report data to their key 
stakeholders.  Because each organization has a different focus, 
each measures its technical and allocative efficiencies 
differently.  SVMH reports on its mission effectiveness in terms 
of customer satisfaction and efficiency.  DON reports on the 
contributions of its' unit inventory management to readiness and 
national defense by measuring effectiveness percentages, i.e., 
percentage measurement of stock availability for filling customer 
requirements. 
B.   BARRIERS TO ACHIEVING ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY 
Once an organization has located or approximated its OP as 
accurately as possible, the organization must recognize the 
barriers which may prevent it from achieving allocative 
efficiency.  Those barriers include: data validity, 
responsiveness to customers' needs, management information 
systems, and stakeholders perceptions. 
1.   Data Validity 
The first barrier concerns the validity of the data itself. 
Since the organization bases many of its future production and 
operational strategies on the location of its OP, the 
organization's data must be as accurate and reliable as possible. 
The organization has a responsibility to satisfy its customers' 
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needs and preferences to the greatest extent possible.  The 
customers, however, may choose not to reveal all necessary 
information regarding their preferences.  Customers may "hide" 
inventory stockpiles because they lack confidence in the 
supplier's ability to meet their requirements expeditiously.  The 
customers may also decide that the paperwork required to properly 
report demand data is too tedious and time consuming.  Without 
complete, accurate data, the organization cannot realistically 
assess its true position along the PPF.  On the other hand, the 
customers may want to communicate their preferences, but the 
organization may not have an adequate and timely customer 
feedback mechanism. 
Not only does MMD use empirical data, such as lack of 
inventory stockpiling, fill rates and stock turn ratios, they 
also meet with their customers periodically to validate the 
inventory mix.  These meetings allow customers to update their 
preferences.  The meetings also reassure the customers that SVMH 
is working to meet their (the customers'') needs.  From SVMH's 
perspective, the customer is an integral part of its overall 
inventory management process. 
DOD relies almost exclusively on demand data from its 
warehouses to determine appropriate warehouse inventory stocking 
levels.  The COSAL inventory model incorporates customer demands 
through annual updates to the Best Replacement Factor (BRF).  The 
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BRF is then used to establish threshold levels to qualify SRI 
items for future COSAL use. The Point Five FLSIP Plus (.5F+) 
model is a partial departure from that norm. It incorporates 
more of the customers' input directly into the final product. 
Customer skepticism about the system's ability to provide the 
customer's requirements, based on previous supply system 
performance, remains a problem for DON. 
For SVMH, the customer actively participates in designing 
and selecting inventories, so customer confidence is high.  It is 
to the customers' advantage in both organizations to accurately 
report their preferences and demands, becoming an integral part 
of the inventory decision-making process.  For DON, the .5F+ 
model should help restore customer confidence in the system's 
ability to meet changing needs. 
2.   Responsiveness to Customers' Needs 
The second barrier, to allocative efficiency concerns the 
organization's ability to implement modifications if they 
identify changes in customer requirements.  To meet the 
customers' changing preferences, the organization must be an 
effective organization in the sense of "doing the right thing." 
The organization must be able to correctly identify the needs and 
wants of their customers in order to satisfy those customers. 
Without knowing precisely what the customer wants, an 
organization may be extremely efficient in providing "the wrong 
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thing."  Similarly, the organization must be able to identify all 
the key stakeholders and customers.  "The key to success in 
public and nonprofit organizations is the satisfaction of key 
stakeholders" (Bryson, 1988). 
SVMH has successfully identified all key stakeholders and 
customers. Additionally, SVMH has provided MMD with the 
capability to rapidly modify and change its product mix through 
monitoring customers' preferences and tracking changes to 
inventory daily.  With a product return-for-credit program and 
low on-hand inventory, MMD can rapidly modify its inventory to 
match changing customers' needs with little adverse financial 
impact. 
DON has also identified key stakeholders and customers and 
monitors and records inventory demands.  Originally that customer 
data was used almost exclusively to update BRFs. However, that 
update had little or no impact on pre-existing shipboard 
inventories.  Customer input was recorded but was not being fully 
utilizedi  While the .5F+ model modifies shipboard inventories in 
response to customers' changing requirements, unlike SVMH, DON 
delays changing its product mix.  DON only implements .5F+ 
changes during the Integrated Logistic Overhaul (ILO), a bulkhead 
to bulkhead storeroom inventory validation and replacement 
process.  ILOs for individual ships normally occur once every 
five to seven years. 
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Modifying storeroom inventories during ILOs may be cost 
effective, but it is not a rapid response to customers' changing 
requirements.  As weapons systems move through their life cycles, 
the range of maintenance parts for those weapons systems changes. 
Not keeping pace with those changes can reduce allocative 
efficiency.  Experience with the USS San Jacinto demonstrates 
that, given sufficient long range planning, interim .5F+ mini- 
ILOs can meet customer's changing requirements and increase both 
material readiness and allocative efficiency. While DON may 
never be able to adopt SVMH's credit exchange rate, the longer 
parts remain onboard unused, the shorter the period of time that 
other naval activities have to reutilize those repair parts 
before they become obsolete. 
3.   Management Information Systems 
The third barrier to efficiency is the organization's vision 
of technology.  The current management information technology 
capabilities of SVMH and DOD are quite different. 
SVMH makes full use of available technology, including 
Electronic Data Interchange (EDI). MMD can provide its customers 
with online, real-time, continuous status on any line item from 
point of order, through receipt, issue and subsequent re-order. 
The availability of any ordered item, both emergency or routine, 
is readily confirmed by the supplier.  If the item is not 
available, MMD can immediately order the item from a different 
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source.  Information regarding stock availability, shipping 
status, shipping manifests, expected shipping dates, and receipt 
dates are available within sixty minutes of placing the order. 
MMD also maintains positive "asset visibility" over all 
inventory.  Inventory "sold" to ready-issue storerooms is tracked 
and inventoried daily for verification. MMD not only has the 
capability to transfer inventory from warehouse to ready-issue 
storerooms, it has the capability of directing inventory 
transfers between ready-issue storerooms. 
The only segment of DON's extensive logistic tracking system 
available to the shipboard user is its CASREP function.  This 
function provides the customer with status and visibility of 
CASREP parts.  However, this status system requires the supplier, 
transshipper and customer to manually track each item.  Current 
follow-up status is often available only by telephone. Message 
traffic is often not available for 12 to 24 hours after data 
transmission. 
While MMD can maintain in-transit visibility of all 
materials shipped, DON's shipping status is generally by 
exception, i.e., shipment delays.  Because of the high financial 
and readiness costs associated with material lost in shipment, 
DOD has embarked on a Defense Total Asset Visibility (DTAV)- plan 
to track material from procurement, through transportation and 
storage pipelines to end-user (Hughes, 1994). 
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Unlike SVMH, DON has limited asset visibility.  While most 
of the shore-based assets are visible (notable exceptions include 
type commander inventory stockpiles or "goldpiles"), most 
shipboard inventories are "invisible."  On occasion, the Navy 
Inventory Control Point, Mechanicsburg, PA (NAVICP-M) has queried 
individual ships regarding availability of parts needed to 
satisfy a CASREP for another ship.  NAVICP-M based its requests 
on the ship's initial COSAL SRI outfitting data, not on any 
currently held inventory data. 
4.   Stakeholders' Perceptions 
The final barrier to achieving allocative efficiency is 
stakeholders' perception.  In the example of "Forced Efficiency" 
in Chapter II, stakeholders (GAO) perceived that DOD was not 
operating as efficiently it could.  GAO was successful in 
imposing restrictions and limitations in an attempt to force DOD 
to become more efficient.  However, by reducing the budget to 
force DOD to act more efficiently, DOD was denied the very 
funding it needed to procure information - information which 
could have been used to determine DOD's OP and initiate plans to 
move towards allocative efficiency. 
C.   CONCLUSIONS 
Research into both DON's and SVMH's inventory management 
programs revealed two very similar organizations with a common 
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goal of satisfying customers' demands.  Based on that research, 
several conclusions were made regarding each organization.  Those 
conclusions and amplifying information are as follows: 
SVMH is a more effective and efficient organization 
than DON. 
SVMH's success is due to its strategic planning. 
SVMH has totally integrated their customers into their 
inventory process. 
DON has made improvements in efficiency. 
DON, through .5F+, incorporates limited customer input. 
.5F+ increases readiness through customer 
participation. 
1.   SVMH as an Effective and Efficient Organization 
When an organization satisfies its stakeholders, which 
include internal and external customers, then that organization 
is an effective organization.  It will "make a profit." 
SVMH is highly effective at meeting its customers' demands 
for a quality, low cost, and timely product.  SVMH maintains its 
competitive advantage by meeting these basic requirements through 
a variety of strategies and tactics, particularly "product 
strategy," "procurement strategy," and "quality tactics." SVMH's 
"product strategy" is to produce quality health care service, 
continually improving that product, and maintaining strong 
communication links between SVMH, its customers, and its 
suppliers.  SVMH's "procurement strategy" evaluates suppliers 
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based on quality and service, integrating those suppliers into 
both SVMH's "production" system and chain of customers, and 
developing modified "Just-In-Time" inventory techniques.  SVMH's 
"quality tactics" include using quality to select suppliers, 
encouraging employees to participate in the "production" process, 
and relying on continuous improvement as the major factor to 
contain costs and enhance service (Heizer, 1993). 
The result of SVMH's strategic planning has produced an 
efficient organization.  By consolidating its purchasing and 
supply functions into a single department,(MMD), SVMH was able to 
realize actual savings in several areas.  By standardizing 
supplies, variability of inventory (duplication of similar 
products) was reduced, which lowered overall costs.  Automation 
and EDI reduced the requirements for part-time buyers from each 
department in the hospital to two full-time buyers for the entire 
hospital. Additional savings in inventory levels, warehousing 
costs, procurement costs, and a high customer service level 
demonstrates that SVMH has achieved a high allocative efficiency 
for its inventory management program. 
2.   Effectiveness and Efficiency of DOD 
Over the past several years DOD has established many new 
initiatives to meet customers' demands for a low cost, quality 
product, expeditiously delivered to the end user.  For example, 
many of the new defense procurement programs are designed to 
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deliver high quality weapons systems and their supporting repair 
parts as inexpensively and quickly as possible.  Based on 
guidelines published by the National Contract Management 
Association (NCMA), the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 
1994 was designed to achieve these goals by requiring future 
contracts to: 
1. Use commercial contracting methods as much as possible, 
2. Fully utilize electronic procurement procedures, 
3. Reduce / eliminate paperwork, and 
4. Streamline the contracting function (NCMA, 1994). 
Other initiatives to expedite delivery of weapons systems 
and parts include procuring commercially available items for 
military use and eliminating military-unique specifications from 
contracts.  One of DON's contributions to inventory efficiency 
enhancements has been the .5F+ COSAL model. 
3.   Effectiveness and Efficiency of .5F+ Inventory Model 
The success of the .5F+ model, like SVMH's success, results 
from putting the needs of the customer first.  By incorporating 
customer driven, demand-based data, customer service levels were 
improved, as reflected by the increase in gross effectiveness 
from 61.8 percent under MODFLSIP to 73.5 percent under .5F+.  The 
overall cost of storeroom items (SRIs) was reduced by $1.26 
million for the frigate USS Roberts.  The .5F+ model is more 
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efficient than the previous MODFLSIP model because it provides 
the customer with more of the right parts at the right location 
for a lower cost than MODFLSIP. 
D.   RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION 
For DON to achieve some of the customer effectiveness 
successes and realize some of the efficiencies that SVMH has 
accomplished, DON should implement the following recommendations: 
• Use "Dialogue and Deliberation" to involve the 
stakeholders and customers in the inventory process 
• Develop a shipboard EDI system 
• Implement .5F+ COSAL outside of ILOs 
• SVMH implement a Prime Vendor contract for Pharmacy 
A more in depth explanation of each recommendation follows. 
1.   Direct Customer Participation in DON's Inventory 
Selection Processes 
SVMH and .5F+ moved closer to their respective allocatively 
efficient points by utilizing customer demand data to determine 
their optimal inventory mix.  For DON to achieve the same level 
of effectiveness and efficiency as SVMH, DON must mimic SVMH's 
methodology to incorporate stakeholders developing and 
determining inventory levels.  While SVMH has a smaller facility, 
inventory, and logistics operation compared to DON, SVMH's 
efficiency can be duplicated. 
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SVMH's strategic management methodology is similar the 
"Dialogue and Deliberation Alternative Approach to Strategic 
Planning" model designed by Dr. Nancy Roberts of the Naval 
Postgraduate School.  The purpose of dialogue "is to go beyond 
any one person's understanding and to achieve insights that could 
not have been achieved individually" (Roberts, 1993). 
Dialogue and deliberation seeks new ways to involve all 
stakeholders, including customers, in the decision-making 
process.  Involving customers and other stakeholders will benefit 
DON by increasing customer awareness and understanding of the 
process, informing stakeholders about both the limitations of 
modeling and budget constraints and the necessity of trade-offs, 
and increasing customer confidence and trust in the decision- 
makers themselves.  Stakeholders' participation is not intended 
to be a referendum but rather an educational process so that 
stakeholders can proffer informed opinions. 
The deliberative aspects of this process require the 
decision-makers to evaluate the opinions and possible 
alternatives offered by stakeholders and customers.  The final 
step requires management to weigh all the inputs and reach a 
final decision - an informed decision that rests with management 
alone.  The goal of a dialogue and deliberation in the strategic 
management plan is to ensure that "all sides of a strategic issue 
might learn and through that process, create a sustainable 
mandate for the organization in the future" (Roberts, 1993). 
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With stakeholder involvement and customer awareness 
increased, two barriers to allocative efficiency are reduced or 
eliminated: stakeholders' perceptions and data validity. 
Stakeholder and customer involvement also ensures that DON is an 
effective organization, satisfying its stakeholders and "making a 
profit." Adopting SVMH's approach to inventory determinations 
will increase the relative efficiency of DON's inventory program 
and increase its level of customer service. 
2.   Development and Implementation of a Shipboard EDI 
System 
SVMH is able to achieve real savings in inventory management 
by fully utilizing Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) technology. 
MMD knows with certainty which items are being shipped, which 
items are back ordered and their shipping dates, actual date of 
receipt (morning or afternoon delivery), and actual quantity 
shipped.  EDI eliminates variability, duplication of data entry, 
improves speed and accuracy of information, brings customers and 
suppliers closer together, and reduces information gaps. 
With shipboard EDI, DON would increase customer service, 
improve logistic efficiencies, reduce inventory through "Just-In- 
Time" like principles, and reduce the average time a customer 
waits to receive inventory.  With EDI, the third barrier to 
allocative efficiency - lack of an adequate information 
technology, is reduced or eliminated.  Fully adapting EDI in the 
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inventory process, DON should be able to more easily move closer 
to allocative efficiency. 
3. Rapid Response to Customers' Requirements Through Early 
Implementation of .5F+ COSAL 
SVMH monitors their customers' demand patterns, preferences, 
and changing requirements. Monitoring and direct customer 
interface coupled with ease of inventory transition enables SVMH 
to rapidly change the product inventory mix.  DON's .5F+ model 
incorporates many of these same elements.  However, by delaying 
storeroom inventory off-loads until Integrated Logistic Overhaul 
(ILO) availabilities, maximum potential contributions to material 
readiness are delayed and allocative efficiency is reduced. 
It might not be cost effective to schedule more frequent 
ILOs, but interim or mini-ILOs might be scheduled between 
regularly scheduled ILOs.  The mini-ILO would not turn inventory 
over bulkhead-to-bulkhead, but rather incorporate selected 
readiness critical equipment.  DON could partially modify its 
inventory to meet customers' needs.  While not eliminating the 
organizational responsiveness barrier to allocative efficiency, 
mini-ILOs would reduce it. 
4. Adaptation of Prime Vendor Contracting for SVMH's 
Pharmacy Department 
SVMH Pharmacy's department should have MMD negotiate a Prime 
Vendor (PV) Contract as previously described in Chapter IV.  SVMH 
would realize cost benefits in personnel, opportunity costs from 
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inventory reduction, and reduced waste from disposal of shelf- 
life expired pharmaceuticals.  Improved customer service levels 
means better service to SVMH's internal and external customers. 
Finally, lower cost of operations, specifically warehousing and 
inventory loss costs, generates savings which can be passed 
directly to the customer as a lower cost of pharmaceuticals. 
E.   RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Areas for further research concern implementation of the 
previous recommendations, as well as in depth investigation of 
questions raised after using the .5F+ model. 
1.   Stakeholders' Participation in DON'S Strategic 
Management Planning 
Dr. Roberts' has completed preliminary research regarding 
the "Dialogue and Deliberation Strategic Management Model." 
Additional research into the mechanics of incorporating this 
model into DON's process for determining shipboard inventory 
mixes, stocking levels, and expected availability outcomes must 
be completed before realizing efficiency gains from full 
stakeholder and customer participation.  Since one of the goals 
of "Dialogue and Deliberation" is to provide information to the 
participants, this model could be used to provide input and 
alternative availability outcomes. 
For example, both a steam driven lubricating oil pump and a 
fire control radar system servo motor are critical to operating 
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the ship.  If, due to budget constraints, spare parts funding can 
only support one of these weapons systems, inventory sparing 
models use reliability data or readiness goals to make that 
determination.  "Dialogue and Deliberation" might resolve the 
problem by placing the fire control spares in the ship's 
storeroom and the lube oil pump spares at a warehouse's ashore 
location.  However, the customers would have provided input 
regarding which parts to place at each location. 
2. Establishing an EDI Compatible Shipboard Information 
Technology System 
Electronic Data Interchange between suppliers, vendors, and 
shore based customer activities generally requires telephone 
communication linkages and compatible computer-based programs. 
Incorporating the customer afloat presents a different set of 
problems, including satellite communication bandwidth and 
precedence competition.  The first step to realizing the full EDI 
benefits afloat requires development and implementation of an 
Information Technology System similar to DTAV (Hughes, 1994). 
3. Cost-Benefit Analysis of Interim ILOs 
Off-loading partial storeroom inventories during interim or 
mini-ILOs can increase overall readiness.  Does the increase in 
readiness justify the cost of the interim ILO? Are mini-ILOs 
every eighteen to twenty-four months more cost effective in terms 
of readiness, configuration management, and shipboard maintenance 
than the current schedule of an ILO every five to seven years? 
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4. What .5F+ Parts Should Not be Off-loaded 
All inventory storeroom parts off-loaded as a result of the 
.5F+ model are sunk costs, i.e., their cost has already been 
expended.  The current .5F+ model establishes COSAL Spares Ashore 
warehouses on both coasts and Pearl Harbor for selected off- 
loaded parts.  This saves re-procurement costs and reduces 
procurement lead time for those items.  Effective 1997, DLA will 
impose a $5.15 per square foot charge for all managed items for 
warehouse space.  Can the net storeroom space made available 
after off-loading MODFLSIP and on-loading .5F+ be sufficiently 
"reutilized" onboard to offset this new cost? 
Under current .5F+ business rules, if an item did not 
qualify under .5F+ but did qualify under MODFLSIP and had eight 
or more demands per ship type, then that item would remain 
onboard as part of the .5F+ COSAL model.  If the item had less 
than eight demands it would be off-loaded for reuse, storage or 
disposal.  Should there be a condition in the off-load business 
rules to retain onboard MODFLSIP items with less than eight but 
greater than four demands, which would otherwise be devalued as 
excess inventory?  Is this cost effective considering the trade- 
off between warehouse costs and shipboard space constraints? 
5. Analysis of Average Customer Wait Time (ACWT) 
The . 5F+ COSAL inventory model places more of the 
maintenance required parts closer to the customer by analyzing 
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previous customer demand history.  Alternative COSAL sparing 
models, such as Readiness Based Sparing (RBS), stock inventory 
based on negotiated weapon system readiness goals.  Until a 
definitive cost benefit analysis can relate the shortage cost of 
a particular weapon system to its impact on national security 
readiness goals, the only comparison between alternative COSAL 
sparing models must be between Average Customer Wait Time (ACWT) 
and Readiness as measured by net, gross and COSAL effectiveness. 
F.   SUMMARY 
This thesis hypothesized that by studying and analyzing 
other organizations and institutions, their approach to inventory 
management could provide a different perspective for alternative 
solutions to improving DON's inventory management. Areas of 
investigation included measurements of efficiency and inventory 
selection to meet customers' requirements.  SVMH identifies their 
customers as internal (employees and suppliers) and external 
(patients, clients and stakeholders which includes most of the 
Monterey Peninsula).  They then craft a strategic plan which 
encourages maximum participation of all customers in SVMH's 
operation.  Their success in achieving this goal can be measured 
by their effectiveness at "doing the right thing" and their 
efficiency in providing quality health care service at a 
reasonable price. 
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Historically, DON utilized limited customer input in their 
decision-making process.  Prior to the .5F+ COSAL inventory 
model, customers demands were recorded to set future inventory 
levels.  The customer received no direct benefit from that input. 
The .5F+ model utilizes direct customer input in determining the 
customer's own inventory mix.  Using the customer's input has 
increased readiness and reduced inventory costs relative to prior 
methodologies.  If DON continues to actively solicit customer 
input, DON should achieve the customer service gains realized by 






1. Relationship between Marginal Benefit and Marginal Cost 
MBX MBY MBZ 
MCX MCX MCZ 
2. Inherent and Operational Availabilities 
MTBF A.    = 
MTBF   +   Met 
MTBM A     = 
MTBM   + MDT 
3. Maintenance DownTime 
MDT  =   (E) + (LDT) + (ADT) 
4. Net, Gross,and COSAL Effectiveness 
Net Effectiveness    =      Total Issues From Stock 
Total Demands For Stocked Items 
Gross Effectiveness    =      Total Issues From Stock 
Total Demands For Any Item 
COSAL Effectiveness   =  Total Demands For Stocked Items 
Total Demands For Any Item 
5. Usage Rate 
Usage Rate = Population * Best Replacement Factor 
4 
6. Best Replacement Factor (BRF) Exponential Smoothing 
New BRF = a  x (New Avg Rate of Demand)   +  (1 - a) x (Old BRF) 
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